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RACIST SPEECH, OUTSIDER JURISPRUDENCE,
AND THE MEANING OF AMERICA
Steven H. Shiffnt
Almost thirty years ago, Harry Kalven, Jr., one of the leading legal
scholars of the twentieth century, wrote a book in which he attempted
to analyze the impact of changing race relations and the civil rights
movement on first amendment law. 1 In the book he observed that
African Americans did not often resort to the courts to combat racist
speech. 2 He was "tempted to say that it will be a sign that the Negro
problem has basically been solved when the Negro begins to worry
3
about group-libel protection."
Times have changed (although few would claim that the plight of
African Americans has basically been solved). 4 African Americans are
deeply concerned with the problem of racist speech in American society, and they are not alone. Many have urged that punitive sanctions
be imposed against the perpetrators of such speech. 5 Perhaps the
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. I owe thanks to Kathryn Abrams, Richard Fallon,Jr., Cynthia Farina, Barbara Holden-Smith, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Gerald Lopez, Seana
Shiffrin, and Gary Simson and to participants in the faculty workshop at Chicago-Kent Law
School for valuable comments on the manuscript; to Bruce Ackerman, David Lyons, and
Winnie Taylor for helpful comments in conversations, and to Penny Zagalis for excellent
research assistance. I especially owe thanks toJulie Hilden both for research assistance and
for insightful editing.
(1965).
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HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRsr AMENDMENT
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4

Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 11.
One of every two black children lives in poverty. CORNELL WEST, RACE MATrRS 7

(1993).

Consider also JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S

SCHOOLS 4 (1991):
Liberal critics of the Reagan era sometimes note that social policy in
the United States, to the extent that it concerns black children and poor
children, has been turned back several decades. But this assertion, which is
accurate as a description of some setbacks in the areas of housing, health,
and welfare, is not adequate to speak about the present-day reality in public
education. In public schooling, social policy has been turned back almost
one hundred years.
On the presence of continuing discrimination, see generally EL.US COSE, THE RAGE OF
A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993); JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WrrH RACISM: THE
BLACK MIDDLE CLASS EXPERIENCE (1994); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The ContinuingSignicance of Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 324, 325-50 (1992).
5 So far as I am aware, however, no one proposes the prohibition of all speech that
might be labelled "racist." Unless the context makes it otherwise clear, I use the term
'racist speech" in this article to refer to a universe of speech that is narrower than many
would deem to be racist in ordinary circumstances. The forms of speech I include within
the term "racist speech" include fighting words and other forms of speech that have trig-

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:43

most persuasive writings have come from practitioners of outsider jurisprudence, 6 a thriving school of thought in American law
gered serious proposals for the imposition of sanctions. See infra notes 22, 203 and text
accompanying note 217.
6 Some of the most influential writings in this school include: Richard Delgado,
Words That Wound: A Tort Actionfor Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling,17 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Words That Wound]; Charles R. Lawrence III,
If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J.431, 458-66
[hereinafter Lawrence, Campus]; MariJ. Matsuda, PublicResponse to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. Rev. 2320 (1989). Beyond these writings the literature,
including the contributions of "outsiders" and "insiders," is voluminous. See, e.g., LEE C.
THE ToLtR'r
SocIETYr FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA
(1986); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WoRDs 45-110 (1993); see generally Symposium,

BOLLINGER,

Campus Hate Speech and the Constitution in the Aftermath of Doe v. University of Michigan, 37
L. REv. 1309 (1991); Symposium, Free Speech and Religious, Racial and Sexual Harassment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 207 (1991); Symposium, Frontiersof Legal Thought II: The New
First Amendment, 1990 DutE L.J. 375; Symposium, Hate Speech After R.A.V.: More Conflict
WAYNE

Between Free Speech and Equality?, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 889 (1992); Akhil Reed Amar,

The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARv. L. REV. 124 (1992);
Alan E. Brownstein, RegulatingHate Speech at Public Universities: Are FirstAmendment Values
Fundamentally Incompatible with EqualProtectionPrinciples?, 39 BuFF. L. ZEv. 1 (1991); David
Cole, Neutral Standards and Racist Speech, 2 RECONSTRUCrION 65 (1922); Richard Delgado,
Campus Antiracism Rules: ConstitutionalNarratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343 (1991)
[hereinafter Delgado, Campus Antiracism]; Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Images of the
Outsider in American Law and Culture: CanFree ExpressionRemedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 1258 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Images]; Donald A. Downs,
Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First Amendment; 60 NORE DAME L. REv. 629
(1985); Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the FirstAmendment: Racist Speech and Equal Liberty, 65
ST.JOHN's L. REv. 119 (1991); Henry Louis Gates,Jr., Let Them Talk- Why Civil Liberties Pose
No Threat to Civil Rights, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20, 1993, at 37; Susan Gellman, Sticks and
Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence?, 39 UCLA L. REv. 333

(1991); Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are they Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REv.
287 (1990); Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties: The Case of Discriminatory Verbal
Harassment, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 81 (1991); Alon Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the First

Amendment, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1887 (1992); Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 95; David Kretzmer,
Freedomof Speech and Racism, 8 CARDozo L. REv. 445 (1987); Kenneth Lasson, RacialDefama-

tion as Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REv. 11 (1985);
Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate/Crimes Hate Speech Paradox:PunishingBias Crimes

and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 673 (1993) [hereinafter Lawrence,
Hate/Crimes]; Peter Linzer, White Liberal Looks at Racist Speech, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 187
(1991); Frank Michelman, Universities, Racist Speech and Democracy in America: An Essay for
the ACLU, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 339 (1992); Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural
Diversity, and the FoundationalParadigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REv. 103 (1992);
Martha Minow, Speaking and Writing Against Hate, 11 CARDozo L. REv. 1393 (1990); Burt
Neuborne, Ghosts in the Attic: Idealized Pluralism, Community and Hate Speech, 27 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 371 (1992); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the FirstAmendment, 32
WM. & MARY L. REv. 267 (1991); RonaldJ. Rychlak, Civil Rights, ConfederateFlags, and Political Correctness: Free Speech and Race Relations on Campus, 66 TUL. L. Rev. 1411 (1992);
Suzanna Sherry, Speaking of Virtue: A Republican Approach to University Regulation of Hate
Speech, 75 MINN. L. REv. 933 (1991); Rodney A. Smolla, RethinkingFirst Amendment Assumptions about Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 171 (1990); Jean Stefancic &

Richard Delgado, A Shifting Balance: Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech Restriction, 78
IOWA L. REv. 737 (1993); James Weinstein, A Constitutional Roadmap to the Regulation of
Campus Hate Speech, 38 WAYNE L. Rev. 163 (1991); Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shelk An
Informal Essay on FormalEqual Opportunity, 87 MicH. L. REv. 2128, 2133-37 (1989); Patricia
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schools. 7 In the area of race relations law," outsider jurisprudence
frequently builds from the lived experience of people of color.9 It
utilizes particularistic analysis and is hostile toward false pretensions
of universality and neutrality.' 0 Its general orientation is pragmatic,"
and its mission is to combat racism and injustice. From this perspective, rules affecting race relations depend for their justification on the
Williams, Spirit-Murderingthe Messenger The Discourse ofFingerpointingAs the Law's Response to
Racism, 42 U. MiAMi L. REv. 127 (1987); R. George Wright, Racist Speech and The FirstAmendment, 9 Miss. C. L. REv. 1 (1988); Darryl Brown, Note, Racism and Race Relations in the
University, 76 VA. L. REv. 295 (1990); Eric J. Grannis, Note, Fighting Words and Fighting
Freestyle: The Constitutionalityof PenaltyEnhancementfor Bias Crimes, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 178
(1993).
7 My description borrows heavily from Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2323-26. For a bibliography of the related concept of critical race theory, see Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, CriticalRace Theoiy: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REv. 461 (1993).
8 The general subject of hate speech involves a variety of issues that go beyond the
issue of racist speech. I am, however, confining this article to racist speech (although I will
refer to some other forms of hate speech at a few points in the Article). Accordingly, I use
the term "outsider's jurisprudence" in this article to refer only to the perspectives of people
of color regarding racial issues (but not to all such perspectives; see infra note 12). Ordinarily that term would include many other perspectives that (because of the scope of my
topic) are not included here, for example, that of feminist writing.
9 This aspect of outsider jurisprudence makes it narrower than the conception of
critical race theory employed in Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 7 (classifying many writings as critical race theory that are neither written by people of color nor derived from the
experience of people of color). In other contexts, some might well equate the part of
outsiderjurisprudence discussed here with critical race theory. I have no quarrel with the
approach of Delgado and Stefancic; my purposes here, however, are not bibliographic, and
limiting the term to the writings of people of color serves a useful purpose in this article.
Despite having made this terminological choice, I do not believe that I need enter into
the debates about the scholarly value of the experience and perspectives of being a person
of color in American society (except to indicate that outsider jurisprudence in my judgment has contributed significantly to the discussions of the hate speech question, among
others). For general debate about the outsider's perspective, see, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY,
SEXING DRESSING ETC.: ESSAYS ON THE POWER AND POLITICs OF CULTURAL IDENTITY ch. 2
(1993); Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and White Male Standards: Some Lessons From the
Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065 (1991); Richard Delgado, When A Stor IsJust A Storj: Does
Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REv. 95 (1990); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color,
100 YALE LJ. 2007 (1991); Alex M.Johnson,Jr., RacialCritiques ofAcademia: A Reply in Favor
of Context 43 STAN. L. REv. 137 (1990); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal
Academia, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1745 (1989); Colloquy, Responses to Randall Kennedy's Racial
Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1844, 1844-86 (1990) (responses by Scott
Brewer, Milner S. Ball, Robin D. Barnes, Richard Delgado, and Leslie G. Espinoza). For a
brilliant exploration of, among other things, the problems connected with generalizing
about race and blackness in general and Africa in particular, see KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH,
IN My FATHER'S HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE (1992).
10 Of course, such pretensions have been attacked not only by outsiderjurisprudence,
but also by critical theorists, feminists, pragmatists, and legal realists. Critical race theory
differs by emphasizing the extent to which claims of neutrality and universality are in reality proxies for racist political and cultural assumptions. In the same vein, feministjurisprudence emphasizes the gendered character of the claims to neutrality and universality.
1
It "accepts as well the pragmatic use of law as a tool of social change, and the
aspirational core of law as the human dream of peaceable existence." Matsuda, supra note
6, at 2324.
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extent to which they combat the racism present in the existing set of
power relations; certainly, if they entrench those power relations, the
rules are not legitimate. In an effort to combat the power of racism,
practitioners of outsider jurisprudence have for the most part argued
12
for the imposition of sanctions against some forms of racist speech.
Unfortunately, no practitioners of outsider jurisprudence sat on
the Supreme Court when the famous cross burning case, RA. V v. City
of St. Paul 3a arrived on its docket. Partly because of their absence, the
Court simply bungled the first amendment job in its most important
encounter with racist speech in the last forty years. 14 The United
States has two first amendments. One is studied in law school. It consists of an extremely complex body of doctrine that few claim to understand. The other first amendment is, in some sense, understood
by every citizen. It is an important part of the stories we tell ourselves
15
about the meaning of America.
Both first amendments were tarnished in RA. V. In ways that have
to
yet be fully appreciated, the case restructured, transformed, complicated, and distorted doctrine. Because it restructured the first amendment so dramatically, and because its doctrinal adventures are set
against one of the most explosive of free speech topics-the relationship between speech and race-RA. V deserves sustained inquiry. Finally, R.A.V. tells a story about the first amendment that affords a
better window into the weaknesses of conservative thought on the subject than any recent case.' 6 Those weaknesses are particularly important, for the stories we tell ourselves about the meaning of the first
amendment do more than influence the outcome of concrete cases;
they also help construct the social and political identity of American
citizens. Beyond tarnishing the first amendment, RA.V missed opportunities to provide fresh thinking about racist speech and to provide direction for lower courts as to how they should approach these
questions.
In this article, I propose to discuss first amendment doctrine and
12

I do not maintain that people of color or people on the left uniformly support hate

speech regulation. See, e.g., Gates, supra note 6. For purposes of this Article, from this
point forward, I will use the term "outsider jurisprudence" to refer exclusively to the work
of those scholars of color who favor hate speech regulation. In other contexts, however,
that limitation would serve no useful purpose.
13 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
14 Prior to R.A.V., the most significant case involving racist speech was Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (group libel of racial groups is not constitutionally protected).
15 For an historical perspective on the rhetoric surrounding the concept of America
and related notions, see Michael Kammen, The Problemof American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration,45 Am. Q. 1 (1993).
16 On the diversity of conservative judicial thought about the first amendment, see
Vincent Blasi, Six Conservatives in Search of the First Amendment: The Revealing Case of Nude
Dancing,33 WM. & MAR, L. REv. 611 (1992).
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the larger symbolism of the first amendment as they relate to racist
speech. In my view the argument that first amendment values (such
as truth, autonomy, self-expression, and liberty) dictate that racist
speech cannot be regulated is ultimately indefensible. I develop that
argument at some length, but the main point of this article concerning racist speech is to open discussion about an issue that has received
little attention perhaps because first amendment arguments play so
large a role in our political identity. My tentative conclusion is that
the racist character of our society should be considered a barrier to
much regulation of racist speech, not the first amendment. I argue
that regulation of racist speech that is not targeted against any specific
individual or small group of individuals will be counterproductive in a
society as racist as this. On the other hand, I believe that individuals
who are the victims of racist speech that is targeted against them
should have a right of redress even if the affording of such redress is
counterproductive to themselves or to a larger group. Moreover, because I think first amendment issues are (after all the arguments are
aired) of minor importance in this area, I think that the victims of
racist speech should have the primary voice in determining whether
sanctions should be imposed in this area. If policy in the end should
turn onjudgments about whether people of color would be helped or
hurt by the regulations, they should have the primary voice in determining what risks they wish to take. My argument, therefore, seeks to
close a discussion about the first amendment (of course, it will not)
and open a discussion about the effectiveness of hate speech regulations in a racist society.
Part I of this article provides a brief description of the facts and
holding of R.A. V Part II provides a deeper description of the doctrinal architecture ofJustice Scalia's majority opinion. In order to make
the discussion more concrete, I compare that doctrinal structure with
the approach taken in the commercial speech area and show that the
two approaches are incompatible.
Part III shows a more general failure: Justice Scalia's framework
provides neither a cogent explanation of the doctrinal framework of
first amendment law, nor a sturdy basis for justifying R.A.V.'s result.
Moreover, the Court's purported concern with content discrimination
in first amendment law is thoroughly compromised.
Part IV shows what really drives the R.A.V opinion: a particular,
implicit conception of the meaning of America. Equally important,
part IV contrasts this understanding with other competing explications of the meaning of America and shows that the R.A. V opinion is
at a loss to deal with them.
Part V examinesJustice White's concurrence, demonstrating how
the absence of an outsider jurisprudential perspective leads him into
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serious error in his assessment of the St. Paul ordinance. Part V also
takes issue with Justice White's apparent focus on injury, arguing that
injury should be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the
imposition of sanctions. Finally, part V explores Justice White's suggestion that the "fighting words" doctrine does not require the prospect of violence and argues that some personal insults should lose
constitutional protection whether or not a breach of the peace is
likely.
Part VI explores the question of whether racist comments that are
not targeted against particular individuals or small groups of individuals should receive constitutional protection. It argues that positive
first amendment values are not sufficiently breached by nontargeted
racist speech to outweigh the harm caused by such speech. Nonetheless, part VI concludes that the racist character of American society
makes it unlikely that racist speech regulation could be effective. In
the process, part VI proposes a different conception of the meaning
of America from those implicit or explicit in the opinions of'Justices
Scalia and White and in the St. Paul ordinance: one that overlaps
with, but is somewhat different from, that of outsider jurisprudence.
In conclusion, part VII retraces how these different understandings of
the meaning of America might bear on resolving racist speech issues.
I
R.A.V.: THE

FAcTs AND THE HOLDING

During the night ofJune 21, 1990, a group of teenagers burned a
cross within the fenced portion of the yard of a black family that lived
17
in a predominantly white neighborhood in St. Paul, Minnesota.
One of the perpetrators, "R.A.V.," was prosecuted under a broadly
worded hate speech ordinance, 18 which he challenged on first amendment grounds. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the chal20
lenge,' 9 and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
17 In reWelfare of RA.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn. 1991), rev'd, R.A.V., 112 S. Ct.
2538 (1992). For an analysis of the Minnesota litigation-and the subsequent appeal to

the U.S. Supreme Court-by the Ramsey County Attorney who represented the city of St.
Paul, see Tom Foley, An Analysis of the View From Above, 18 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV.903, 90506 (1992).
18

Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
112 S. Ct. at 2541 (quoting Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAUL, MiNN., LErIS. CODE
§ 292.02 (1990)).
19 464 N.W.2d at 509-11.
20 501 U.S. 1204 (1991).
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Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court accepted the Minnesota
court's construction of the ordinance, 21 which limited its scope to
those "fighting words" 22 based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender.23 Moreover, Justice Scalia purported not to reach the question of
whether the fighting words doctrine should be reconsidered or
whether the ordinance could constitutionally reach all of the expression it sought to proscribe. 2 4 Instead, the .principal defect he spied in
the ordinance was that it discriminated on the basis of subject matter:
[E]ven as narrowly construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the
ordinance is facially unconstitutional.... Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics.
Those who wish to use "fighting words" in connection with other
ideas-to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality-are not covered.
The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special
prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored
25
subjects.
No doubt, Justice Scalia was right: the ordinance exhibited both
26
content discrimination and subject matter discrimination on its face.
Moreover, Justice Scalia determined that the St. Paul scheme embraced a form of point-of-view discrimination as well:
One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all "anti-Catholic
bigots" are misbegotten; but not that all "papists" are, for that would
insult and provoke violence "on the basis of religion." St. Paul has
21

22

112 S. Ct. at 2542.
"Fighting words" is a category of speech that has long been declared to be beneath

the protection of the first amendment. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942) (no first amendment protection for "words ... which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"); RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at
2541. Despite the fact that the Court often cites Chaplinshywith approval, it is often suggested that Chaplinsky is no longer good law on the ground that the Court has not since
upheld a single fighting words conviction. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, RegulatingRacist Speech
on Campus: A Modest Proposal?,1990 DuKE L.J. 484, 510. The suggestion is itself technically
inaccurate. SeeLucas v. Arkansas, 423 U.S. 807 (1975), dismissingLucas v. State, 520 S.W.2d
224 (Ark. 1975) (dismissing for lack of a substantial federal question, after a prior remand,
an attack on a fighting words conviction under a statute that prohibited "profane, violent,
vulgar or abusive ... language [that] must in its common accept[ance] be calculated to
aro[u]se to anger the person about or to whom it is spoken or addressed, or to cause a
breach of the peace or assault," 520 S.W.2d at 225). More importantly, the lower courts
have frequently upheld post-Chaplinsky convictions under the fighting words doctrine. See
Strossen, supra, at 512. That the few Supreme Court fighting words cases have been decided in favor of defendants does not speak to the overall standing of the Chaplinsky doctrine. For better or worse, the doctrine is alive and well.
23 R.A.V., 112 S.Ct. at 2542; see supra note 18 (quoting the ordinance).
24
25

Id.

Id. at 2547.
A statute forbidding false statements would involve content discrimination, but not
subject matter discrimination, on its face.
26
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no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle,
27
while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules.
But that was not the end of the matter. Justice Scalia entertained
the argument that point-of-view discrimination might be permissible if
a sufficiently powerful justification were provided. 28 St. Paul argued
that the ordinance was justified despite any point-of-view discrimination "because it is narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests."2 9 Justice Scalia recognized that helping to safeguard the basic
human rights of groups historically subject to discrimination was a
compelling state interest.3 0 He argued, however, that clearing the
compelling state interest test did not take the ordinance the full distance. He maintained that the "'danger of censorship' presented by a
facially content-based statute"3 ' required a showing that such a statute
was necessary to serve a compelling state interest.3 2 The ordinance
failed this test, he concluded, because of the "existence of adequate
content-neutral alternatives ....
An ordinance not limited to the favored topics, for example, would have precisely the same beneficial
effect."3 3 In other words, a pure fighting words statute would avoid
34
the impermissible discrimination.
II
COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND RACIST SPEECH

Although I propose to show thatJustice Scalia's opinion has many
weaknesses, its basic premise is sound: Although many forms of
speech have been described as unprotected (such as obscenity and
some forms of defamation), the purported status of a category of
speech as "unprotected" does not necessarily justify discrimination
within the category. It would, for example, be unconstitutional to
tack on additional penalties just because the victim of an unprotected
form of defamation or fighting words was a Republican.3 5 More difficult to determine is the test to apply when content discrimination
27
28
29
30

RA.Y., 112 S. Ct. at 2548.

Id. at 2549-50.
Id. at 2549.
Id. He also stated that the ordinance "can be said to promote" the compelling state
interests. Id It is surprising thatJustice Scalia was apparently prepared to accept this meager showing ("can be said to") under his strict scrutiny standard. Even the showings required in commercial speech and time, place, or manner contexts are somewhat more
demanding. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-81 (1989) (restrictions must be
"narrowly tailored").
31 RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549 (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448 (1991)).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 2550.
34 Cf. Lawrence, Hate/Crimes,supranote 6, at 712 n.149 (majority opinion implied that
it would have upheld an ordinance that prohibited all fighting words).
35
It makes little difference whether this result is described as violating equal protection, the equality dimension of the first amendment, or both.
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takes place within a category of unprotected speech. Justice Scalia
maintains that the appropriate test to apply is a form of strict scrutiny,3 6 but some doctrinal savagery is required in order to make that
conclusion presentable.
Consider, for example, the commercial speech case of Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.3 7 Discussion of that case should be
helpful in filling out important details of Justice Scalia's analysis as
well as some of the obstacles to its success. There, Puerto Rico engaged in a blatant form of subject matter discrimination. It permitted
commercial advertisements generally and advertisements for horse
racing, the lottery, and cockfighting in particular.3 8 Nonetheless, it
39
prohibited advertising of casino gambling to Puerto Rican residents.
In testing the constitutionality of this discriminatory approach,
the Court did not utilize any form of strict scrutiny. It was enough for
the Posadas Court that the legislature "felt that.., the risks associated
with casino gambling were significantly greater than those associated
with the more traditional kinds of gambling."40 In dissent, Justice
Brennan objected to the Court's use of relaxed standards, observing
that the record disclosed no legislative finding concerning the com4
parative ill effects of casino and other forms of gambling. '
A case like Posadas raises a difficult question for Justice Scalia's
approach: If relaxed standards are employed to deal with subject matter discrimination within a category of protected speech (even recognizing that commercial speech is less protected than other forms of
protected speech),42 how can one justify strict scrutiny for the examination of subject matter discrimination within a category of unprotected
speech?
Justice Scalia does not directly respond to this question, but he
does maintain that "the prohibition against content discrimination...
applies differently in the context of proscribable speech than in the
area of fully protected speech." 43 Specifically, he points to four circumstances in which content discrimination is permissible. None of
those circumstances, however, distinguishes Posadas.
A.

The Reason for the Lower Level of Protection
Justice Scalia first observes that " [w] hen the basis for content dis-

112 S. Ct. at 2549-50.
478 U.S. 328 (1986).
38 Id. at 342.
39 Id. at 335. The Puerto Rican scheme also discriminates on the basis of audience,
but that discrimination is not relevant for present purposes.
40
Id. at 343.
41
Id. at 353 n.3.
See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
42
43
RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545.
36
37
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crimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of
speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists."4 4 He provides an example from the commercial speech area. A state could "choose to regulate price
advertising in one industry but not in others, because the risk of fraud
(one of the characteristics of commercial speech that justifies depriving it of full First Amendment protection .. .) is in its view greater
there." 45 In Scalia's view, such subject matter discrimination would be

unproblematic because no idea or viewpoint discrimination is present.
Instead, the justification for the regulation is the risk of fraud, and the
risk of fraud is itself one of the reasons that commercial speech is
proscribable.
How does Posadasfit into this analysis? Not very well. The advertising of casino gambling is not based on any of the reasons thatjustified the lower place commercial speech occupies in the hierarchy of
first amendment values. In developing the commercial speech exception, the Court first attempted to justify treating deceptive, misleading, or fraudulent speech differently from other forms of protected
speech because of the durability or hardiness, and the verifiability, of
commercial speech. 46 But these justifications do not warrant a ban on
advertising involving true commercial speech such as was present in
Posadas. Indeed, apart from declaring that commercial speech traditionally gets less protection, 47 or invoking "common-sense," 48 or worrying that the treatment of commercial speech on a par with
49
noncommercial speech would "dilute" the speech that really counts,

the Court has not provided an explanation for the lesser protection of
commercial speech. It has not justified the tradition, explained the
common sense, or provided the reasons why dilution would come
about.5 0
Consider now why Puerto Rico was said in Posadas to oppose the
advertising of casino gambling. According to the Tourism Company's
brief, it did so not for fear of fraud, but for fear of "the disruption of
moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering
of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration of
organized crime."5 1 I dare say none of these reasons were the kinds of
44
45

Id.
Id. at 2546 (citations omitted).

46
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
47
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (analyzing state regulation of advertising by lawyers).
48
Id. at 455-56.
49
Id. at 456.
50
I do not mean to question the Court's conclusion, merely itsjustificatory prowess.
51 Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (citing
Brief for Appellees 37).
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reasons invoked to justify the commercial speech exception. Nonetheless, the Court applied a test that, asJustice Brennan observed, was
a relaxed standard. It was enough to advance directly a substantial
governmental interest by means no more extensive than necessary to
serve that interest, and the application of that test in Posadaswas even
less strict than it sounded. 52 In any event, strict scrutiny it was not. If
strict scrutiny was not appropriate in Posadas,we are owed an explanation as to why it was appropriate in R.A.V
B.

Secondary Effects

Justice Scalia's second exception is the "secondary effects"
doctrine:
Another valid basis for according differential treatment to even a
content-defined subclass of proscribable speech is that the subclass
happens to be associated with particular "secondary effects" of the
speech, so that the regulation is 'Justified without reference to the
53
content of the... speech."
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 54 is an important example of the
"secondary effects" principle. Renton upheld an ordinance that zoned
adult bookstores and theaters differently than it did other bookstores
and theaters. 55 The City of Renton said it passed the ordinance not
primarily out of concern for the content of the films or the direct
response of audiences to such films, but rather out of concerns for
"secondary effects" such as the deterioration of neighborhoods
(crime, property values, the environment).56 Because the city's alleged purposes focused on "secondary effects," the Court did not
57
classify the ordinance as content-based.
Renton's failure to recognize the ordinance as content-based is
quite remarkable. The result of the "secondary effects" doctrine after
all is that some communities like Renton may let Bambi show in your
local theater while excluding sexually explicit films.58 Moreover, a
strong part of the justification for stringent scrutiny of regulations directed at content has been that hostility toward the speech may lie
For discussion, see Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-81 (1989).
53 RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,
48 (1986) (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976))) (quotation marks and ellipsis in original).
54 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
55
Id. at 44.
56 Id. at 48.
57 Id. at 47-50.
52

58

Not all communities have received the deferential treatment afforded to Renton.

For discussion of many of the lower court cases, see Kimberly R. Smith, Comment, Zoning
Adult Entertainment: A Reassessment ofRenton, 79 CAL.L. REv. 119 (1991).
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behind the recitation of other interests. 59 Indeed, substantial grounds
exist for believing that the Renton City Council in fact passed its ordi60
nance out of hostility toward sexually explicit films.

A more generous reading of Renton (with some support in subsequent opinions) might focus on the interests put forth by the state
(rather than its motivation) and ask whether those interests are jeopardized by the communicative impact of the activity the state seeks to
regulate. Thus, one could argue that the prostitution associated with
59 See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburg Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114, 132 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536
(1980).
60
AsJustice Brennan pointed out in dissent, the findings initially put forth by the City
of Renton exhibited hostility to the messages emanating from adult theaters. 475 U.S. at
59. For example, one finding was that the
[1]ocation of adult entertainment land uses on the main commercial thoroughfares of the City gives an impression of legitimacy to, and causes a loss
of sensitivity to the adverse effect of pornography upon children, established family relations, respect for marital relationship and for the sanctity
of marriage relations of others, and the concept of nonaggressive, consensual sexual relations.
Id. at 59 n.3. Additionally, the City determined that the "[1]ocation of adult land uses in
close proximity to residential uses, churches, parks, and other public facilities, and schools,
will cause a degradation of the community standard of morality. Pornographic material
has a degrading effect upon the relationship between spouses." Id.
Significantly, the findings involving "secondary effects" were added after the litigation
was filed. Id. at 56-57. Despite the prelitigation findings of the Renton City Council, the
Court determined that the post-litigation findings represented the predominate intent of
the City Council. Id. at 47-48. The Court reasoned in part that if the city "had been concerned with restricting the message purveyed by adult theaters, it would have tried to close
them or restrict their number rather than circumscribe their choice as to location." Id. at
48 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 82 n.4 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring)). Of course, it would have done no such thing. To outlaw adult theaters or to
limit the number of adult theaters would be to outlaw or set quantitative limitations on
nonobscene protected speech. If the city were hostile to the content of adult movies, it
would have been ill-advised to enact legislation so obviously vulnerable to constitutional
challenge. Its failure to enact such legislation sheds no light on its motivation.
Moreover, the emphasis on motivation is itself questionable. See, e.g., William E. Lee,
Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: The Doctrineof Time, Place, and Manner
Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 757 (1986) (focus on motive or content as
traditionally understood provides insufficient protection for free speech); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in FirstAmendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113 (1981) (same);
Susan H. Williams, Content Discriminationand the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. Rav. 615
(1991) (same). Whatever the motivation of the Renton City Council, the impact of the
ordinance would be the same. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its
Content: The PeculiarCase of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81, 111-12 (1978)
(arguing that the impact is not viewpoint neutral in that such restrictions operated against
speech that encourages relaxed sexual mores).
It seems clear thatjustification of the result in Renton must turn to some degree on the
character of the speech. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 49 (suggesting that Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), may be confined to businesses that sell sexually
explicit materials and opening the door to the argument that Renton is limited in the same
way). It also seems likely that the ordinance would restrict speech that encourages the
subordination of women. Having argued that the method of Renton is difficult to justify, I
have not argued against its result.
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adult theaters-and the resulting decline of property values-is
caused not by the communicative impact of the activity, but by the
physical concentration of potentially receptive clients. This reading,
however, has significant difficulties. First, it should not make a difference that the state regulates the content of a film because that content
draws people to the theater rather than because of the impact the film
has upon them once they get there. More important, the causal analysis of this argument is at least open to question. It is difficult to believe that the erotic arousal caused by the content of the films is
unconnected with the sexual commerce that follows.
But let us assume that Renton and the "secondary effects" doctrine
are models of constitutional analysis. Does Renton, so conceived, shed
light on the relationship between Posadasand R.A. V.? Certainly, many
of the state concerns in Posadas,local crimes, prostitution, corruption,
and organized crime are Renton-like. Nonetheless, the Posadas case is
not on a par with Renton. To make the cases more alike, Renton would
need to have involved the advertisingof adult theaters. 61 Under those
circumstances, however, it becomes more difficult to see Posadas as a
"secondary effects" case. For the advertisements to cause the harm of
concern to Puerto Rico, the message would have to directly persuade
its audience to gamble. 62 Moreover, one of the principal interests argued by the Tourism Company, the disruption of moral and cultural
patterns, would seem to follow directly from an audience response to
the advertisements: 63 If the advertisements persuade Puerto Ricans to
gamble, their morality will be undermined, and the culture subsequently damaged. In other words, the state seems concerned about
the morality of casino gambling, but not the morality of cockfighting,
and it therefore outlaws the advertising of one, but not the other. Obviously, that is point-of-view discrimination.

61 This would not put the two on a par either because in the proposed hypothetical,
the advertisement is for a constitutionally protected film; casino gambling, on the other
hand, is not constitutionally protected.
62 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988) (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens &

Scalia, JJ.):
So long as the justifications for regulation have nothing to do with... the
actual films being shown inside adult movie theaters, we concluded that the
regulation was properly analyzed as content neutral.
Regulations that focus on the direct impact of speech on its audience
present a different situation. Listeners' reactions to speech are not the type
of "secondary effects" we referred to in Renton.
63 Posadas,478 U.S. at 341. Of course, the Court could ignore directly content-based
interests as it did in Renton. See supra note 60.
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Incidental Effects

Justice Scalia unhelpfully combines a third category of cases, the
64
"incidental effect" cases, with the "secondary effects" line of cases.
Under the "incidental effect" theory, if a statute is directed at conduct
generally and hits speech incidentally as one form of the conduct,
there is no content or subject matter discrimination of first amendment interest because the statute is not directed at speech.65 So, as
Justice Scalia recognized, if a legislature prohibits sexual harassment
(whether by physical or symbolic means), the imposition of penalties
for sexually harassing speech would not violate any first amendment
prohibition against content discrimination. 66 Similarly, it would seem
to follow that if St. Paul were to prohibit racial harassment (whether
by physical or symbolic means), the imposition of penalties for racially
harassing speech would not violate any first amendment prohibition
against content discrimination. Although this feature ofthe opinion
is obviously significant, the incidental effect principle upon which it
relies does not distinguish Posadas,because the Puerto Rican statute in
Posadaswas directed exclusively at speech, that is, commercial advertising of a certain sort.
D.

The Catch-All Category

Finally, Justice Scalia suggests that there might be another exception for cases where "there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot."67 Posadashardly qualifies for this exception

because the hostility to the idea of participating in casino gambling
literally screams out from the recitation of the legislature's interests in
morality and the culture. In the end, it seems obvious that Posadas
cannot be passed off under any of Justice Scalia's exceptions.
III
CONTENT DISCRIMINATION AND R.A.V.

The irreconcilability of R.A.V. with Posadas is part of a larger failure. Justice Scalia's framework provides neither a cogent explanation
of the doctrinal framework of first amendment law, nor a sturdy basis
RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
65 Id. This does not mean that no first amendment test applies. See Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). It does
mean that the tests ordinarily applied when content discrimination is present are not employed. But cf STEVEN H. SHIFMN, THE FiRsT AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 9-45
(1991) (warning that the distinction between content-based regulation and regulation directed at conduct is not as important as many commentators believe).
66 RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546. For the suggestion thatJustice Scalia could not mean to
go that far, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First
(forthcoming).
Amendment Dog that Didn't Bark, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. _
67 RA.V, 112 S. CL at 2547.
64
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for justifying the result in R.A.V In attempting an overview of the
exceptions he parades, Justice Scalia suggests that each provides a basis for concluding that the subject matter restrictions which have been
upheld are not "even arguably 'conditioned upon the sovereign's
agreement with what a speaker may intend to say."' 68 Or, as he also

puts it: "[T] here is no realistic possibility that official suppression of
ideas is afoot."69 This description of the case law breathes new life

into the expression about ostriches hiding their heads in the sand.
When the government outlaws threats against the President,7" advertisements for casino gambling 7 or alcoholic beverages, or the burning of draft cards, 72 or when it engages in a campaign of zoning adult
theaters out of neighborhoods,7" no one but a person wearing a black
robe with a strong will to believe or befuddle could possibly suppose
that "there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is
afoot."74 Point-of-view discrimination permeates these categories. If
point-of-view discrimination were as major an evil as the Court often
supposes, one would think that a demanding test would have been
applied in some of these cases. But many of the justices presumably
share the governmental view that advertisements for casino gambling
or alcoholic beverages, the burning of draft cards, and the kind of
films shown in adult theaters are not worth much. They either do not
look for point-of-view discrimination or devise tests that command
them not to look. Perhaps they cannot see the ways in which they
themselves discriminate.
ButJustice Scalia was sharply on the lookout for such discrimination in R.A. V Regrettably, he was more cavalier when it came to discussing the possibility that the St. Paul ordinance came within one of
his own exceptions. Recall thatJustice Scalia had allowed subject matter discrimination "[w]hen the basis for content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is
proscribable." 75 It could well be argued, as Justice Scalia recognized
in footnote seven, that "the ordinance merely regulates that subclass
68

Id. at 2547 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)

(Stevens, J., dissenting in part)) (citation omitted).
69 Id. at 2547.
70
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
71 Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
72 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). For commentary suggesting that the
government's purpose in prohibiting draft-card burning was to suppress dissent, see
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESsION 85 (1970); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 824-25 (2d ed. 1988); Dean Alfange, Jr., Free Speech
and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-CardBurning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REv. 29, 41

(1973).
73 Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
74

RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.

75

Id. at 2545.
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of fighting words which is most likely to provoke a violent response."7 6
Justice Scalia first responded that St. Paul had not made the argument. 77 But to make it clear that it would not have mattered if St.

Paul had made the argument, he opined that it "appear [ed] unlikely"
that the subclass covered by the ordinance could be so described.7 8
Is this description really unlikely, however? Consider Justice
Frankfurter's related remarks about group racial or religious libel: 79

Illinois did not have to look beyond her own borders or await
the tragic experience of the last three decades to conclude that wilful purveyors of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups
promote strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot
community. From the murder of the abolitionist Lovejoy in 1837 to
the Cicero riots of 1951, Illinois has been the scene of exacerbated
tension between races, often flaring into violence and destruction.
In many of these outbreaks, utterances of the character here in
question, so the Illinois legislature could conclude, played a significant part.8 0
Even if racial and religious insults did not specially give rise to the
possibility of violence, what of the related argument that racial, religious, and gender insults are especially serious instances of the kind of
"words... which by their very utterance inflict injury"8 ' in the fighting
words context.
Here we approach the heart of the matter. Justice Scalia
responds:
This is word-play. What makes the anger, fear, sense of dishonor,
etc. produced by violation of this ordinance distinct from the anger,
fear, sense of dishonor, etc. produced by other fighting words is
nothing other than the fact that it is caused by a distinctive idea,
conveyed by a distinctive message. The First Amendment cannot be
82
evaded that easily.
That the injury is caused by a distinctive message is obvious; that
the first amendment prevents protection against that injury by prohibiting the message, however, is the issue to be decided. Notice that if
R.A.V. were prosecuted under a nondiscriminatory fighting words statute, the offense could only be triggered by uttering a distinctive
76

Id. at 2549 n.7.

77
78

Id.
Id.

79
Gender insults are more complicated because they involve a number of subclasses.
In any event, the Court only needed to look at racial insults for purposes of this argument,
and it is on particularly weak ground when that is the focus.
80
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258-59 (1952).
81 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). See supra note 22.
82 RA.V., 112 S. Ct at 2548.
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message. Absent unusual circumstances, if R.A.V. insulted a person's
driving ability, a jury could reasonably find that no fighting words
were present. If R.A.V. insulted a person's race, however, the distinctive character of the message would contribute to ajury determination
of a fighting words violation. Thus a jury could determine that racist
speech was especially damaging. The puzzle is why the St. Paul City
Council could not do the same. It is simply not the case that the first
amendment absolutely prohibits the regulation of injuries caused by
messages. Indeed, Justice Scalia's suggestion that a fighting words
statute is a content-neutral alternative to the St. Paul ordinance authorizes the ad hoc application of such a statute's terms to distinctive
messages.
Justice Scalia does not clearly deny that the injuries of concern in
the ordinance are qualitatively different than the kinds of injuries triggered by fighting words as a class. The closest he comes to discussing
the point is where he builds on an assertion that the fighting words
category implicates an unacceptable "mode of expressing whatever idea
the speaker wishes to convey."s3 He then says that
St. Paul has not singled out an especially offensive mode of expression-it has not, for example, selected for prohibition only those
fighting words that communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed
to a merely obnoxious) manner. Rather, it has proscribed fighting
words of whatever manner that communicate messages of racial,
gender, or religious intolerance. Selectivity of this sort creates the
possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the expression of par84
ticular ideas.
Precisely. But quite beside the point. If the argument is that a
particular subject matter implicates the very risks the category was
designed to cover, but in a more severe way, what difference does it
make that the category of speech involved is not the most offensive
mode of speech. The question is whether it causes the most serious
form of injury. Since when is the mere possibility of idea discrimination in regulating less than fully protected speech of such enormous
constitutional import?
Obviously, it would have been easy enough to write an opinion in
which the existence of the state's substantial interest in deterring racial, religious, and gender injuries was sufficient to justify the ordinance. Claims that the ordinance was motivated by opposition to the
content could have been swept aside by reference to the kinds of devices used in cases involving commercial speech or adult theaters.

83

84

Id. at 2549 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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It would not have been an occasion for "dancing in the streets" 8 5
if the Court had resorted to any such device, however. Intellectual
dishonesty is no virtue. There is no point in pretending that St. Paul
lacked hostility to the underlying message. Of course, St. Paul was
hostile to the messages it sought to criminalize-which is not to deny
that the injuries were of concern to those who passed the ordinance.
The question is whether and when such hostility should be constitutionally fatal.
Justice Scalia's apparent response to the question is that such hostility is constitutionally fatal if the Court is prepared to recognize its
existence and if the legislation in question is unable to pass a test of
strict scrutiny. 86 But this analysis is unduly simplistic. We have already
seen that the Court has not subjected subject matter discrimination
within categories of speech receiving less than full protection to the
kind of strict scrutiny that Justice Scalia supposes is the usual first
amendment standard. Even if Justice Scalia's recharacterization of
the cases involving less than fully protected speech were on the mark,
there would be no easy skip to the conclusion that strict scrutiny was
appropriate.
Strict scrutiny is ordinarily employed when the state attempts to
use content discrimination against otherwise protected speech, for example, to regulate the time or place in which such speech can be uttered.8 7 Thus, when Chicago prohibits speech near a school except
speech pursuant to a labor dispute, the Court employs strict scrutiny
to test the constitutionality of the content discrimination.8 8
But idea discrimination is not always a constitutional sin, and
strict scrutiny is not a given. In determining that obscenity or some
forms of defamation are unprotected, for example, the Court has
forthrightly balanced or deferred to the interests proffered by the
state. Why, then, is strict scrutiny appropriate for racist speech in the
form of fighting words, but not for defamation or obscenity?
Consider obscenity. The Court in ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton 9
asserted that the distribution of obscene material is not protected
under the first amendment because it debases human personality, 90
violates the social interest in morality,9 ' and interferes with the state's
85

Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of the First

Amendment", 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 221 n.125 (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn's oral comment about New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
86 RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
87 Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
88

Id.

89
90

413 U.S. 49 (1973).
Id. at 63.

91

Id. at 61.
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right to maintain a decent society. 92 In short, it is not good speech; it
is not valuable. Whatever slight value it may have is said to be outweighed by "the social interest in order and morality."9 3 Indeed the
very definition of obscenity is filled with decisions about value. To be
obscene, material first must appeal to prurient interests; second, must
be a patently offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct; and
third, must not have "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
94
value."
The third prong of the test is obviously phrased in terms of value.
The prurient interest part of the test, however, is an especially clear
example of point-of-view discrimination. Appeals to prurient interest
are defined as appeals to a "shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
sex, or excretion,"9 5 and cannot be taken to include appeals to "normal" interests in sex.9 6 That is, appeals to interest in "good, old fashioned, healthy" 97 sex are constitutionally protected even if they are
patently offensive to contemporary standards and lack serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. Appeals to "abnormal" interests
98
in sex are criminalized when the other requirements are satisfied.
If it is fair to ask whether obscenity's contribution to truth is outweighed by the social interest in order and morality and to base an
answer upon what a legislature could quite reasonably determine (a
far cry from strict scrutiny), then why are the same question and scrutiny inappropriate for racist speech? If obscenity can be judged by
whether it jeopardizes the "right ... to maintain a decent society," 99
why is racist speech not subjected to the same test?

92 Id. at 69.
93 Id. at 61 n.12 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (quoting
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))).

94 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
95 Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S 491, 498 (1985) (quoting MODEL PENAL
CODE § 207.10(2) (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957)).
96 Id. at 499.
97 Id.
98 Id. The treatment of such appeals thus discriminates on the basis of point of view.
For examples of other exercises of legally permissible point-of-view discrimination together
with a perceptive discussion of determining what should count as point-of-view discrimination, see Cass R. Sunstein, Pornographyand the FirstAmendment 1986 DuKE L.J. 589, 609-17.
99 ParisAdult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69 (quotingJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199
(1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
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Perhaps the answer is that the suppression of obscenity does not
involve the suppression of "ideas."1 00 But this is "word-play." 10 1 To
distinguish between decent sex and morbid sex is obviously point-ofview discrimination. Moreover, opponents of obscenity object to a variety of themes: the notion that sex is a casual affair, the idea that sex
is an "animal connection" rather than a human relationship, 10 2 and
03
the need for a public morality.
Obscenity law, then, is an instance in which content discrimination, subject matter discrimination, and point-of-view discrimination
coincide, yet strict scrutiny is not employed' 0 4 and the legislation is
not invalidated. This leaves two possible responses. One might be:
"So much the worse for obscenity law. Let us get rid of it." No doubt
many liberals would take that view, but it is not clear that any member
of the current Court is prepared to afford obscenity full constitutional
protection-and certainly notJustice Scalia. 10 5 Justice Scalia needs to
reconcile his approach to racist speech with his approach to obscenity.
Alternatively, one might argue that unlike racist speech, obscenity
is not political (except for obscenity that has political value but not
enough to deserve the label of "serious" political value) and that political speech is particularly privileged. Here much depends on the definition of "political." Assume for the moment that feminist
conceptions of the political'0 6 are ignored (so that obscenity is
nonpolitical). Is it clear that a racist insult implicates politics? We can
assume the perpetrator of a racist insult holds politically controversial
100 It also has disturbing implications for the first amendment status of art and music.
Consider Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics ofthe Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. or.REV. 1, 16:
[B]eauty has constitutional status too, the life of the imagination is as important to the human adult as the life of the intellect. I do not think the
Court would find it difficult to protect Shakespeare, even though it is hard
to enumerate the important ideas in the plays and poems. I am only suggesting that Mr. Justice Brennan might not have found it so easy to dismiss
obscenity because it lacked socially useful ideas if he had recognized that as
to this point, at least, obscenity is in the same position as all art and
literature.
101 See supra text accompanying note 82.
102
On the latter two themes, see IRVING KRISTOL, REFLECTIONS OF A NEOCONSERVATrVE
45, 47 (1983).
103

See HARRY M. CLOR, OBSCENrIY AND PUBUC MORA=rly 223 (1969) ("The law's retreat

to hard-core pornography would.., involve a substantial lowering of public standards.").
The interest in preventing women from being treated as sex objects was regarded as an
interest that justified the prohibition of too narrow a class of material. See id. at 222-23.
104 ParisAdult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 61 (deferring to the Georgia legislature on the
question of whether obscenity contributes to crime).
105 In particular, see FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 250-53 (1990)

(Scalia,J., dissenting in part) (arguing that a business devoted to the sale of highly explicit
sexual material can be closed down, not merely zoned to a particular part of the
community).
106 See generallyFEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLrrIcAL (Judith Butier &Joan W. Scott eds.,
1992) (capacious conceptions of the political).
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views, but we can also assume that the disseminator of obscene materials holds politically controversial views about the themes contained in
the materials. Does this make either of them political?
In a sense, the answer does not matter because the underlying
assumption of the political argument (that strict scrutiny applies to
political speech and that point-of-view discrimination is not permitted) is itself misplaced. The law of defamation, much of which involves political speech, makes this point clear. The rhetoric of strict
scrutiny has not been employed in defamation cases. Rather, the
Court has balanced the interest in reputation against the interests in
freedom of expression, 10 7 and that balancing process has produced a
complex set of rules.' 0 8 Perhaps defamation can be distinguished
from racist speech on the ground that the former does not involve
idea discrimination. Notice, however, that defamation involves a form
of content discrimination that has predictable discriminatory impact.
If you say nice things about powerful people, the defamation laws will
not bite you; if you say critical things, you are at risk. 10 9 To be sure,
this is content-neutral in that any defamatory criticism is subject to
these laws (no particular ideas are singled out), but the general deterrence of criticism is arguably as serious a concern as the deterrence of
a particular defamatory statement.
Perhaps more serious from a first amendment perspective, defamation laws, like "pure" fighting words statutes, can not be enforced
without the authorization of ad hoc point-of-view discrimination by
judges and juries. In many defamation trials, the state must determine (often with the help of a jury) whether particular critical statements are true or false. These statements may involve public officials,
public figures, or private persons. They may be of vital import in the
marketplace of ideas. Nonetheless, the judicial branch of government
makes an official determination as to whether the point of view expressed by the defendant about the plaintiff is true or false and, if
false, whether subject to monetary sanctions if the views are deemed
to be false. This official governmental determination of truth and falsity is pure point-of-view discrimination. Moreover, the impact of this
process is not confined to trials. Anyone publishing a critical state107
108

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).

For example, public officials and public figures must show that defamatory statements were published as a knowing or reckless falsehood in order to recover;, private persons must show negligence in order to recover against media defendants. See id Private
persons may recover presumed and punitive damages against nonmedia defendants, at
least when the matter is of private interest, without a showing that the statement was published as a knowing or reckless falsehood, see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), but may or may not be able to do so against media
defendants with similar publications. Compare Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, with Greenmoss.
109 See generally NoRMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTEarING THE BESr MEN: AN INTERERETIVE
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL (1986).
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ment about someone he or she believes might sue must take into account what a typical jury is likely to think about that statement. As a
consequence, some critical statements are easier to make than others.
Obviously, this entire process deeply implicates first amendment
values.
It is, therefore, a nonstarter to suggest that under the defamation
laws, "ideas" are (or should be) protected, and only statements of fact
subjected to scrutiny." 0 This just leads to the question of why ideas
are more important than assertions of fact. Surely assertions of fact
make important contributions to our understanding of society and its
government. Assertions of fact are afforded a measure of protection
under the first amendment; no one has put forth a compelling argument that they are less important than ideas. Assuming we could define an "idea" in the first place, we would be at a loss to explain why
facts or assertions thereof are less important. Indeed, a major part of
the rationale for protecting opinions (as opposed to facts) in defamation law has been that they say so little that ajury cannot reliably determine their truth or falsity."' A marketplace of ideas without facts
would be bankrupt. The intrusion of defamation laws into the marketplace of ideas and facts discourages many true assertions of fact
and entails a genuine and undeniable first amendment loss.
My point, however, is not that defamation laws should be regarded as unconstitutional. My point is that defamation laws permit
point-of-view discrimination-without applying strict scrutiny-because the interest in reputation is thought to outweigh the right of
freedom of expression in particular contexts.
Does racist speech differ? Racist speech laws single out particular
ideas for special regulation; defamation laws do not. This no doubt is
a distinction. However, since (as I have argued) defamation laws license ad hoc point-of-view discrimination by juries and likely cause
writers and publishers to take the potential unpopularity of their positions into account in deciding whether to publish critical statements,
this distinction seems to make little difference. To discern whether it
does, we need a firmer grip on what is wrong with idea or point-ofview discrimination in the first place.

110 Compare Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40 (ideas absolutely protected under the first amendment) with Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990) (denying that there is
any "wholesale defamation exception for anything that might be labeled 'opinion'").
111

See, e.g., Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation:

Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 825, 879 (1984) (opinions should be equated
with nondisprovable assertions); Jeffrey E. Thomas, Comment, Statements ofFact, Statements
of Opinion, and the First Amendment 74 CAL. L. Ray. 1001 (1986) (contending that the dis-

tinction between facts and opinions in the case law is rooted in "verifiability").
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IV

RA. V,CONTENT

DISCRIMINATION, AND THE MEANING OF

AMERICA

Justice Scalia's opinion does not provide much assistance. He
maintains that the rationale of the prohibition against content discrimination is the "specter that the Government may effectively drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."1 12 That concern,
however, is difficult to take seriously in the context of RA. V St. Paul
prohibited only a small class of "fighting words," words which make a
slight contribution to truth"13 -just a particular socially unacceptable
mode of presentation injustice Scalia's view. It is hard to see how that
raises the "specter that the Government may effectively drive certain
14
ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."'
Even more telling is Justice Scalia's "content-neutral" alternative
to the St. Paul ordinance: a "pure" fighting words statute, which, he
maintains, could serve the valid government interest in protecting basic human rights of members of groups historically subject to discrimination. 115 But this content-neutral alternative would drive the very
same ideas and viewpoints (along with others) from the marketplace.
Thus, Justice Scalia cannot plausibly claim to be concerned about this
result.
However facially content-neutral a fighting words statute might
appear to Justice Scalia, juries or judges would inevitably make content-based judgments in applying the statute. Justice Scalia, for example, complains that the St. Paul ordinance discriminates between
statements based on race-which it reaches-and statements based
on political affiliation, union membership, and sexual orientationwhich it does not.116 Nonetheless, underJustice Scalia's content-"neutral" ordinance, a judge or jury could make on an ad hoc basis the
same type of distinction the St. Paul City Council was not permitted to
encode as a rule, deciding, for example, that comments about race
are fighting words, but comments about union membership or politics are not.

112 112 S.Ct. at 2545 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.Ct.
501, 508 (1991)). See generally Grannis, supra note 6, at 205.
113 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), quoted in RA.V., 112 S.Ct.

at 2543.
114 RA.Y., 112 S.Ct. at 2545.
115 Id. at 2550. Leave aside that if the interest is protecting members of groups that
have historically been subject to fighting words, this alternative would not be "narrowly
tailored" to serve that interest even under the rather relaxed standards currently employed
by the Court.
116 Id. at 2547; see supra note 18 (text of St. Paul ordinance).
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Nonetheless, there is something about explicit content discrimination that has piqued Justice Scalia's concern. 117 The root of that
concern (and that of other justices as well), I suspect, is at once symbolic and substantive. Justice Scalia is attracted to a particular vision
of America, as a nation that spurns paternalism and tolerates different
points of view, however hateful. It is a nation that is formally neutral
in race relations (affirmative action programs from his perspective are
undesirable), 1 8 ideally neutral in the economic market (although the
Constitution does not guarantee this), and neutral in the "marketplace of ideas." Of course, government will engage in programs that
have differential impact on groups and ideas, but substantive equality
is not the goal of the Constitution.
From this perspective, there is little to be said for general racist
speech statutes such as the St. Paul ordinance. If such statutes target
group libel, they are paternalistic and intolerant. If they are applied
against fighting words, and if one of the rationales is that victims tend
to internalize hostile messages, they can be paternalistic. If the statutes are based on hostility to the message expressed, they can be intolerant. Moreover, as Justice Scalia specifically argues, 119 contentneutral alternatives exist to guard against the harm.
Of course, Justice Scalia's perspective is not unqualified. Government can enter the intellectual marketplace (even if it skews it in important ways) to communicate its own messages. 120 Moreover,
government can take the value of speech into account in determining
its degree of constitutional protection. A model of anti-paternalism,
tolerance, and neutrality has difficulty explaining why, for example,
commercial speech and obscenity get less than full protection. Moreover, as we have seen, 121 substantial point-of-view discrimination is immanent in existing law, a body of law that Justice Scalia for the most
part accepts.
Beyond the doctrinal tensions, however, we should question how
attractive the picture of the nation implicit in Justice Scalia's first
amendment jurisprudence really is. Anti-paternalism 12 2 and tolera117

I do not contend, of course, that this concern is prompted by any sympathy for a

person who burns a cross on the lawn of a black family in the dead of night. Nor do I think
Justice Scalia had any sympathy for the flag burning defendant in Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989), where he also voted against content discrimination.
118 For criticism of this aspect of his perspective, see, e.g., Kimberle Williams Crenshaw,
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw,
101 HARv. L. REv. 1331 (1988).
119
RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550.
120 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding regulations restricting abortion-related speech by recipients of federal family planning funds).
121
See supra notes 70-111 and accompanying text.
122 As Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 189, 212 (1983) writes: "The Court has long embraced an 'anti-paternalistic' under-
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tion123 are strong American values, and there is much to be said for
(and against) the idea of a neutral government, particularly one
which plays no favorites in the intellectual market. Justice Scalia's national picture is certainly one with deep roots in American culture.
Nonetheless, there are other important stories to be told about
the nation. For example, one could describe a country which has historically evolved from a nation of slavery into a nation with a profound
constitutional commitment to racial and ultimately also gender equality. Similarly, the country has evolved from a nation permitting stateestablished churches into a nation where religious equality is a constitutional given in every state.
These stories may be exaggerated conceptions of the country, but
they are important parts of the ways we explain and tell stories about
our constitutional culture. Ordinarily, these stories and ideals can innocently be held out as mutually consistent. In the racist speech context, however, these stories compete, and innocence is no longer
124
possible.
How does one choose among convincing and plausible stories?
One solution, proposed by outsider jurisprudence, is egalitarian: pick
the story that benefits those who have been subordinated. I would
note, however, that prominent practitioners of outsider jurisprudence
balance competing stories about freedom and equality. Mari Matsuda
does not advocate the ban of all racist speech; 125 even Catharine
26
MacKinnon does not advocate the abolition of all sexist speech.'
Perhaps these positions are purely strategic. For the moment, it does
not matter. At a minimum, Matsuda, a strong proponent of outsider
standing of the first amendment." For a particularly strong statement by the Court, see
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976). But see, for example, Posadasand the obscenity cases, which permit paternalistic
restrictions.
123 As Stone, supra note 122, at 216, writes, "'Intolerance-based' justifications for restricting expression, like paternalistic justifications, are constitutionally disfavored, even if
the restriction does not substantially prevent the communication of a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of information." On the relationship between the first amendment and
tolerance, see generally LEE C. BOLUNGER, THE TOLERANT Socmrv (1986).
124 The innocent believe it possible to discover "some sort of truth which can tell us
how to act in the world in ways that benefit or are for the (at least ultimate) good of all."
Jane Flax, The End of Innocence; in FEMmisrs THEORIZE THE PoLrcAL, supra note 106, at
445, 447. For the claim that the reconstruction amendment makes certain forms of racist
speech a proscribed badge of servitude, see Amar, supra note 6.
125 See infra text accompanying note 218.
126 To the contrary, see MAcKNNON, supra note 6, at 106 (emphasis added):
When equality is recognized as a constitutional value and mandate, the idea
that some people are inferior to others on the basis of group membership is
authoritatively rejected as the basis for public policy. This does not mean that
ideas to the contrary cannot be debated or expressed It should mean, however,
that social inferiority cannot be imposed through any means, including expressive ones.
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jurisprudence, is at pains to recognize the existence of competing
12 7
stories.
In contrast, Justice Scalia's approach to racist speech is relentlessly simplistic. He does not take the competing story seriously. That
is why it is clear to him that a comprehensive fighting words statute is
an obvious alternative to the St. Paul ordinance, despite the fact that it
ignores the equality story and lacks the St. Paul ordinance's symbolic
power. Justice Scalia has a response to this, but he does not have an
argument: "[T] he only interest distinctively served by the content limitation is that of displaying the city council's special hostility toward
the particular biases thus singled out. This is precisely what the First
128
Amendment forbids."
Justice Scalia's description of the government's interest dilutes it
unfairly. St. Paul's interest, of course, is not in allowing its city council
to have a special moment of pique. Rather, it is to establish not only
that religious, racial, and gender epithets are particularly harmful, but
also that, as a matter of public morality, such epithets are a public
disgrace.
As to the latter point, Justice Scalia insists that this kind of proclamation of public morality is precisely what the first amendment forbids. 129 But this is naked assertion, a selection of one story over
another. How is it that a state's attempt to establish public morality in
outlawing obscenity is not also precisely what the first amendment forbids? If interests can be balanced against each other, why can't constitutional stories be set beside each other and accommodated?
I do not mean to suggest that Justice Scalia's overall position is
hopeless. We can only speculate, however, as to how he reconciles his
positions on racist speech, obscenity, and defamation. I suspect he
thinks that obscenity is nonpolitical smut unworthy of protection; that
defamation, although political, causes harm for which there has traditionally been a remedy (plus, he is no fan of the press); and that racist
speech is political as well (although he would agree it can be regulated if the statute is not targeted by subject matter or if it is directed
at conduct generally) but not the source of traditionally-recognized or
serious harm. Those who object to racist speech, he may believe, are
often too thin skinned. Of course, it is one thing to assume that racist
speech is political and quite another to suppose that racist speech in

127
128
129

See Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2321, 2348-56.
RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2550 (1993).
Id.
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the form of fighting words is political, as if fighting words were a form
31
of dialogue or debate' 30 in the public sphere.'
The authoritarian simplicity of remarks such as "This is precisely
what the First Amendment forbids" 13 2 does not sit easily with the
deeply compromised vision Justice Scalia actually holds. I do not
mean to say that complexity can be avoided. I do mean to suggest that
if content-neutrality is the first amendment emperor, the emperor has
no clothes.
Once it is recognized that a reference to content-neutrality is not
a conversation stopper, the City of St. Paul's story becomes difficult to
dismiss abruptly. St. Paul, by passing its ordinance, said in effect:
We understand that idea discrimination is a deep intrusion into
First Amendment values, but the toleration of racial, religious, and
gender epithets has serious implications for equality and our public
morality. Our concern about .those issues is so great that a symbolic
commitment to prohibiting those epithets is of more importance
than the First Amendment story. Indeed, the very existence of the
First Amendment story and our willingness to trump it shows how
strongly our community values equality and public morality.
On this understanding, St. Paul cannot fairly be understood to
have displayed little appreciation for first amendment values. Instead,
it has adopted a first amendment story very different from Justice
Scalia's. Recall that its ordinance, as construed by the state supreme
court, applies only to fighting words. 13 3 If someone gives a public
speech involving racial superiority but no fighting words are addressed to any individual or small group, the ordinance does not apply. Perhaps St. Paul shares Justice Brennan's story about our
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open."1 3 4 On this
understanding, St. Paul's conviction is based on appreciation for life
in an exciting and diverse country. It need not be committed to the
view that racial inequality might be a fine idea and that the intellectual marketplace can decide. Opposition to racial inequality was, no
doubt, an important part of why it outlawed racial epithets.
This is certainly a different first amendment story than the one
Justice Scalia implicitly tells, and yet all Justice Scalia can say on behalf
of his own is either irrelevant (since his own alternative would drive
130 Justice Scalia seems to make this precise assumption when he objects in RA.V. that
one side is licensed to speak one way in "debate," but the other side is precluded from
doing so. See supra text accompanying note 27.
131
Cf Foley, supra note 17, at 914 n.36 ("[B]y characterizing fighting words as a form
of 'debate,' the [R.A.V.] majority legitimates hate speech as a form of public discussion.").
132
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550.
133
See supra text accompanying note 22.
134
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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even more ideas from the marketplace than St. Paul's) or an exercise
in pure fiat ("This is precisely what the first amendment forbids").135
Moreover, his opinion in RA.V. provides little direction for legislatures and lower courts on a key issue: assuming that fighting words
statutes are constitutional, what are fighting words?
V
WHAT ARIE "FIGHTING WORDS"?

Justice White's RA. V opinion, joined by three other justices,
speaks to the question of what fighting words are, but in terms that
need elaboration and qualification. Justice White believes the St. Paul
approach was flawed not because it reached too little speech (as Justice Scalia would have it), but because it reached too much; in other
words, it was overbroad. There are two problems with Justice White's
argument. First, it seems clear that he misinterprets the ordinance.
Second, Justice White criticizes the ordinance for not being specific
enough about the nature of the injuries which would suffice to trigger
sanctions. As I will argue, this focus on injury is unhelpful. Nonetheless, I will suggest (at some length) that there may be substantial merit
in Justice White's further suggestion that direct personal insults
(whether or not they are likely to trigger violence) are rightly distinguished from racial insults that are not targeted at particular
individuals.
A. The Overbreadth Issue
In retrospect, it is more than a little odd that Justice White authored an opinion declaring the statute to be overbroad. Justice
White has for many years led the Court in limiting that doctrine's
reach, 3 6 successfully championing the view that those whose own conduct is unprotected should not prevail in challenging a speech statute
37
without a showing that its overbreadth is "real [and] substantial."'
As written, the St. Paul ordinance was surely a ripe candidate for a real
and substantial overbreadth finding, but since the Minnesota
Supreme Court construed the ordinance narrowly, restricting it to
fighting words, Justice White's enthusiasm for the overbreadth argument is somewhat difficult to understand.
As written, the St. Paul ordinance is sweeping:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to,
135 RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550.
136 See generally Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (unconstitutional overbreadth must be "substantial"); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (extending substantial overbreadth doctrine to books and films).
137 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
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a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits
disor38
derly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.'
One need not get up too early in the morning to appreciate that placing a symbol on public or private property (with consent) "which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses alarm, anger, or
resentment" on the grounds specified in the ordinance might be protected in a wide variety of circumstances. Any controversial placard
concerning race, gender, or religion is likely to provoke anger in
others. If the St. Paul ordinance had been read for all it was worth,
few would deny that the R.A. V case presented a serious constitutional
issue. l3 9
Justice's White opinion did not deny the power of a state court to
provide a narrowing construction, 140 nor did it argue that there was
anything untoward about the particular narrowing construction in
R.A.V He made no claim, for example, that the construction was so
novel that the defendant could not have anticipated it.14 1 In considering the overbreadth issue, then, the justices were required to take the
statute "as though it read precisely as the highest court of the state has
43
interpreted it,"142 and Justice White recognized this.1
Here, however, Justice White went astray. While he properly examined the text of the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion, not just
that of the ordinance, his rendition of the opinion-joined by three
of his fellow justices-is eccentric. According to Justice White, the
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the ordinance prohibited fighting words, defined to include any expression that "'by its very utterance' causes 'anger, alarm, or resentment.'" 144 From that premise it
was an easy ride to a conclusion condemning the St. Paul ordinance:
"The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or
resentment," wrote Justice White, "does not render the expression
45
unprotected.'
One might be initially suspicious of this interpretation, for it is
difficult to see how this interpretation could have been seen-by Justice White or by the Minnesota Supreme Court-as a narrowingcon138

112 S. Ct. at 2541 (quoting Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST.

LEGIs. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
139
See, e.g., Terminiello v.

PAUL, MINN.,

City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (stirring people to anger

protected under first amendment).
140 For commentary on limiting constructions, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense

of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991).
141
142
143

See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22-23 (1973).
RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2558-59 (White, J., concurring).

144
145

Id at 2559.
Id.
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struction. The ordinance, as construed by Justice White, seems to
cover exactly the same speech covered by its literal terms namely,
speech reasonably likely to cause anger, alarm, or resentment on the
grounds specified in the ordinance.
To be sure, the Minnesota Supreme Court did say something
that, left alone, would have justified Justice White's reading:
Unlike the flag desecration statue at issue in Texas v. Johnson, the
challenged St. Paul ordinance does not on its face assume that any
cross burning, irrespective of the particular context in which it occurs, is subject to prosecution. Rather, the ordinancecensors only those
displays that one knows or should know will create anger, alarm or resent1 46
ment based on racial, ethnic, gender or religious bias.

If the Minnesota court had stopped there, no doubt Justice White
would have been on the mark. But the court went on:
In In re S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978), this court narrowly
construed Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (1990), which prohibits
"offensive, obscene, or abusive language or... boisterous and noisy
conduct tending reasonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in
others," (emphasis added) to refer only to 'fighting words," S.L.J., 263
N.W.2d at 419, thereby preservingit in the face of an overbreadth attack.
Similarly limited to expressive conduct that amounts to "fightingwords!-

conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to incite immediate vioat
lence, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 572, 62 S. Ct.
47
769-the ordinance in question withstands constitutional challenge.'

As this excerpt makes clear, the Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly construed "anger, alarm, and resentment" narrowly, to refer
only to fighting words. It did not say, as Justice White supposed, that
fighting words include any expression that "'by its very utterance'
causes 'anger, alarm, or resentment.""148 Nor was the state court
under the illusion, asJustice White claimed, 149 that "the mere fact that
expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment" is a
sufficient basis for excluding speech from constitutional protection.
If there were any question about the Minnesota Supreme Court's
intentions, inspection of the case it relied upon, In re Welfare of
S.L.J., 5

0

should have resolved all doubts. S.L.J. considered the consti-

tutionality of a state disorderly conduct statute which, like the St. Paul
ordinance, prohibited speech that would tend "reasonably to arouse
alarm, anger, or resentment in others." 15 1 S.L.J. explicitly recognized
In re Welfare of RA.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. CL 2538
(1992) (emphasis added).
147 Id. (emphasis added).
148
RA.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2559.
149
Id.
150 In re Welfare of S.LJ., 263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978).
151 MINN. STAT. § 609.72(1)(3) (1992).
146
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that the "vulgar, offensive, and insulting" 5 2 character of words does
not alone make them constitutionally punishable even if the "overwhelming majority of citizens" 153 would condemn them. Therefore, it
found that the statute as written did not satisfy the constitutional defi54
nition of "fighting words" and was unconstitutional on its face.'
Nonetheless, the court in S.L.J. proceeded to construe narrowly
the statute to apply only to "fighting words." 55 Moreover, the way it
applied the doctrine made it clear that words causing resentment
were not necessarily tantamount to "fighting words." The facts before
the court in S.L.J. involved a fourteen-year-old girl who had been questioned by police officers who had a hunch she might have been sniffing paint or stealing bicycles.' 56 After the questioning, she was told
to go home because it was past her curfew.' 7 After starting down an
alley to depart, S.L.J. and her friend turned around, somewhere between fifteen and thirty feet from the squad car in which the officers
were sitting, and said: "Fuck you pigs."' 58 Arrests for disorderly con59
duct quickly followed.'
The petition against S.LJ. alleged that she had used language
that she knew or had reasonable grounds to know would "tend to
arouse resentment in others." 160 One of the officers testified: "I was
161 At
mad. I was upset. They didn't have any right to say that to me."
the same time, the officer admitted that he did not even consider a
62
violent response.
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted the police officer's testimony and seemed to appreciate his resentment, 6 3 applying the fighting words test, it ruled that S.LJ's speech was
constitutionally protected:
Under this test, appellant's conviction for disorderly conduct
cannot stand. While it is true that no ordered society would condone the vulgar language used by this 14-year-old child, and as the
court found, her words were intended to, and did, arouse resentment in the officers, the constitution requires more before a person
can be convicted for mere speech. In this case, the words were di152

S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d at 416.

153

Id.

154

Id. at 419.
Id. at 419-20.
Id. at 415.
Id.

155
156

157
158
159
160

161
162

163

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.

Id.
Id. at 419 ("[N]o ordered society would condone the vulgar language used by this

14-year-old child ....").
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rected at two police officers sitting in their squad car from a distance of 15 to 30 feet by a small, 14-year-old child who was on her
way home when she turned to the officers and made her statement.
With the words spoken in retreat from more than 15 feet away
rather than eye-to-eye, there was no reasonable likelihood that they
would tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace or to provoke violent reaction by an ordinary, reasonable person. Thus, the
state has failed to prove that under these circumstances the words
uttered by appellant were "fighting words," and both her conviction
for disorderly conduct and the finding of delinquency based on the
conviction must be reversed.'6
The Minnesota Supreme Court's reliance on S.L.J. in construing
the St. Paul ordinance at issue in R.A.V. makes Justice White's reading
deeply implausible. Clearly the court in R.A. V understood that
arousal to anger or resentment is an insufficient reed upon which to
base criminal punishment. Clearly the court also understood the flag
burning case's doctrine that " [i] f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable."' 65 Justice White's intimation to the contrary is flatly wrong.
This leads to a difficult question: How does one account for Justice White's failure? One might not have expected him to go wrong
here: he championed a narrow conception of the overbreadth doc66
trine and he has been praised for his strong analytic power.'
Is there anything about his more general constitutional perspective that could explain his opinion? Some might think that Justice
White's hostility to affirmative action might spill over to a case of this
kind. 67 After all, Justice Blackmun complained in his concurrence
that the majority may have been influenced by "the temptation to decide the issue over 'politically correct' speech."' 68 ButJustice White's
opinion exhibits no such purpose. It is sharply critical of Justice
Scalia's majority opinion, observing, for example:
Any contribution of this [Court's] holding to First Amendment jurisprudence is surely a negative one, since it necessarily signals that
expressions of violence, such as the message of intimidation and
racial hatred conveyed by burning a cross on someone's lawn, are of
164

Id. at 419-20.

165 Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989). Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court
in S.L.J. quoted that passage from the Johnson opinion shortly after it explicated its limiting
construction. 464 N.W.2d at 511.
166 KennethJost, The Courthip of Byron Mhite, A.B.A.J., Oct. 1993, at 63; cf Blasi, supra
note 16, at 659 (depictingJustice White as a toughminded conservative who values analytic
precision).
167 E.g., Jost, supra note 166, at 66.
168
RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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sufficient value to outweigh the social interest in order and morality
that has traditionally placed such fighting words outside the First
Amendment.' 69
If Justice White's performance in R.A.V. cannot be traced to his
attitudes about affirmative action, it is also difficult to attribute it to
anything in Justice White's more general understanding of the judicial role. Granted, admirers ofJustice White understood him to be a
firm opponent of any form of results-oriented jurisprudence, including outsiderjurisprudence. 170 From this perspective, the Constitution
is best interpreted by a thoroughly impartial judge, committed to following the rule of law, and prepared to address the merits of each case
17 1
as it is presented.
ButJustice White does not approach the Constitution as if it were
a blank slate. Justice White's interpretation of the Constitution provides for ajudicial role limited by the need for broad deference to the
state and federal governments, 172 even when they attempt to limit
freedom of speech. A judge armed with this understanding would
have no incentive to decide RA.V. against the City of St. Paul, but
Justice White did. 173 I am inclined to think that he just made a
mistake. 174
Nonetheless, a delicious irony accompanies that mistake. If Justice White was committed to impartiality (albeit with a certain background constitutional understanding), so was Justice Thurgood
Marshall (albeit with a certain different background constitutional understanding). Justice Marshall understood the Constitution to favor
the powerless in general and the racially disadvantaged in particular.
Whether this form of outsider jurisprudence is described as results
oriented, or as impartiality within a particular background understanding, is of little moment. What is important is that Justice Marshall, unlike Justice White, would have been actively on the lookout
for persuasive arguments that would have protected the victims of
cross burning. It is hard to believe thatJustice Marshall would have so
169

Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring). The emphasis on violence in the quoted para-

graph leaves open the possibility that Justice White might strike down campus speech
codes prohibiting speech that did not involve threats. But see infra text accompanying note
189. For language suggesting that "fighting words" might be limited to threats or intimidation when people approach patients of abortion clinics, see Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2529 (1994).
170 See Dennis J. Hutchinson et al., Perspectives On Wite: A Roundtab4e, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1993, at 69; cf Blasi, supra note 16, at 660 (contending thatJustice White appears opposed
to ideology).
171 Hutchinson et al., supra note 170, at 69-70.
172 Jost, supranote 166, at 64, 67.
173 So, of course, did his concurring colleagues. Oddly, so far as I am aware, no commentator on RA.V has called attention to this error.
174
Among other things, I very much doubt that he or his clerks read S.L.J. For a more
specific discussion of S.LJ., see supra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
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blatantly misread the Minnesota opinion, and that Justice White
would have persisted in his misreading once it had been called to his
attention. Thus the irony: Those who admire judges like Justice
White for their alleged impartiality need to recognize that attention to
real world results and the diversity of possible constitutional understandings can make a vital contribution to the technical proficiency of
the Court. If a voice for outsider jurisprudence had been present on
the Court, Justice White's error could have been corrected before its
publication.
B. The Unhelpful Search for Injury
As I have argued, Justice White would have invalidated the St.
Paul ordinance at issue in R.A. V based on an incorrect reading of the
Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion. In addition, his suggestions for
what might constitute an acceptable ordinance need considerable refinement. In R.A. V., the Minnesota Supreme Court followed Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire's characterization of "fighting words" as those
which "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." 7 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court did not
specify the nature of the "injury" required, other than to make it clear
(albeit not to Justice White and his signatories) that anger, alarm, or
resentment do not in and of themselves suffice. In fairness to the
Minnesota Supreme Court, this is more than the United States
Supreme Court did either in Chaplinsky or in any subsequent case.
Thus, when Justice White observed in R.A.V that the Minnesota court
was "far from clear in identifying the 'injur[iesl' inflicted by the expression that St. Paul sought to regulate," 176 he cast a stone from a
glass house.
Lower courts trying to make sense of this aspect ofJustice White's
opinion may focus on the word injury and come up with awkward,
awful-sounding formulations requiring 7 7 extreme or "really extreme"
emotional distress, or distress that requires psychiatric or medical
care. This approach, if adopted, would be understandable. The injuries associated with "fighting words" are often underappreciated. Indeed, a major contribution of outsider jurisprudence is to highlight
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis added).
RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2559 (WhiteJ, concurring).
177 One possibility that would presumably satisfy justice White would be one that coupled injury with the recognition that "individuals are not required to welcome unwanted
speech into their homes and that the government may protect this freedom." See Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1985) (upholding ordinance prohibiting picketing in front of
and directed at a particular residence); see also Foley, supra note 17, at 910 n.26 (contending that Justice White's RA.V opinion hints that expression that merely causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment may not be protected when targeted at a captive audience).
Nothing in Justice White's analysis, however, suggests that only such a restriction would
pass muster.
175

176
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the nature and extent of the injuries caused by racist speech. 178 But a
doctrinal focus on injury obscures an important point: injury should
be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the imposition of
punitive sanctions.
Consider first the question of whether injury should be a sufficient
condition for the imposition of punitive (or other) sanctions. The
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress provides an apt analogy. Among other things, the tort requires showings not only (1) that
severe injury was actually caused and (2) that an intent to cause emotional distress existed, but also (3) that the activity offends generally
accepted standards of decency or morality or is outrageous. 179 As
Chief Justice Rehnquist observed for a unanimous Court:
Generally speaking the law does not regard the intent to inflict
emotional distress as one which should receive much solicitude, and
it is quite understandable that most if not all jurisdictions have chosen to make it civilly culpable where the conduct is sufficiently
"outrageous." 180
By omitting any discussion of the context in which the injury
might occur, the language of Justice White's RA.V opinion seems to
suggest that a showing less stringent than that required for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress might suffice. He seems to
invite lower courts to specify the type' 81 of injury that insulting utterances might bring about, but not to address the question of whether
speech was sufficiently "outrageous." But this approach is surely
wrong.
Suppose a person informs his or her betrothed that he or she
plans to break off the engagement in a soliloquy packed with angry,
emotional, and insulting language. Assume further that it results in
severe emotional injury and that the angry speaker hoped to hurt the
victim. I venture that this has occurred on millions of occasions. Yet
it would be surprising if our hypothetical victim could recover in tort.
178 See, e.g., Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 6, at 135-49; Lawrence, Campus,
supra note 6, at 452-66, 482-83; Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2326-41.
179 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1966).
180 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988). Of course, the tort has limits.
Hustler imposed limits on the ability of public figures and public persons to recover for a
mass media parody even when it was regarded as offensive and was intended to inflict
emotional distress. One might also argue that the quoted language of the ChiefJustice's
opinion only extends to civil liability, but I do not think the argument is persuasive. First,
his use of the term "civilly culpable," id., may simply refer to the fact that the states generally do not impose criminal liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress per
se. Second, his statement may be a nod to someone like Justice Stevens, who might want to
make such a distinction here. WhateverJustice Stevens' views might be, it seems unlikely
that the Court would balk at a formulation of the Chaplinskyrule that tracked the contours
of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
181 RA.V., 112 S.Ct. at 2559.
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A court would be loath to conclude that the perpetrator's conduct was
sufficiently outrageous.
If mental injury alone cannot afford a sufficient basis for tort liability, certainly it cannot be the sole basis for criminal liability, for
which penalties are harsher. Mental cruelty may be a sufficient
ground for divorce in some states; it would be surprising if, without
more, it could justify a jail sentence.
Injury, then, should not be a sufficient condition for criminal liability; neither should it be a necessary condition. Return to the facts of
R.A.V Assume that the family witnessed the burning cross, but suffered no emotional distress. What if the family was angry or somewhat
fearful, but not distressed? What if they were so much in denial as to
be blas6? It may make sense for tort liability to turn on the existence
of emotional distress (particularly if compensation is a major goal),
but why should criminal liability in this kind of circumstance turn on
the response of the victims?
Notice that the record in RPA. V disclosed nothing about the reaction of the victims. 1 82 Of course, a black family living on a residential

street in a predominantly white neighborhood could reasonably interpret the appearance of a burning cross on its front lawn as a terroristic
threat directed at the family as a whole or at one of its members. As
the Sixth Circuit observed, "a black American would be particularly
susceptible to the threat of cross burning because of the historical
connotations of violence associated with the act."18 3 Cross burning
might reasonably prompt "fear, anxiety, and apprehension for
i8 4
safety."
Neither punishment nor culpability should turn on whether the
act induces a certain type of reaction from the victim. Victims should
not be required to report their precise thoughts and emotions, nor
should the perpetrator who intended to insult on the basis of race be
exonerated simply because the victim turns out to be exceptionally
85
hardy.'
182 For discussion of their reaction, see Charles H. Jones, ProscribingHate: Distinctions
between CriminalHarm and Protected Expression, 18 WM. MrrCHELL L. Ray. 935, 948 (1992).
183 U.S. v. Salyer, 893 F.2d 113, 116 (6th Cir. 1989).
184 Ford v. Hollowell, 385 F. Supp. 1392, 1397 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
185 Cf Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (psychological injury need
not be shown for "hostile environment" sexual harassment claim); 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1988)
(defining federal crime of threatening President without regard to whether President was
afraid, emotionally distressed, or impaired in his duties). Similarly, the law of attempts

does not require success or a showing of injury as a prerequisite for the imposition of
punishment; for reasons similar to those provided in the text, I would not require a showing that the victim understood the perpetrator's remarks to insult on the basis of belonging to a group historically oppressed because of its race, color, or national and ethnic
origin, but I regard that as a closer question. Certainly, in a tort context it should be
required. See Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 6, at 179 (tort action for racial insult
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Reconsider Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. When Chaplinsky
hurled insulting remarks at a police officer, the Court made no effort
to determine the emotional reaction of the police officer or his inclination to fight under the particular circumstances.1 8 6 If that part of
Chaplinsky's approach is correct, it makes no sense to probe the specific character of the injury to the members of the African American
family in R.A.V
Is that part of Chaplinsky's approach right? As a principle, I would
say so, but that is a far cry from affirming either its language or its
result. As I have already suggested, an utterance's mere propensity to
inflict an injury should not be sufficient to remove it from constitutional protection;1 8 7 such a rule would obviate consideration of the
context of particular situations and would therefore lack a suitable
constitutional foundation. People in the course of being arrested by
police officers are likely to depart from the Queen's English with great
frequency; their rudeness does not deserve to be a criminal offense,
and officers unable to respond coolly in such situations do not belong
in law enforcement. 88
C. The Bottom Line
IfJustice White's focus on injury needs revision, another portion
of his R.A.V opinion is somewhat more helpful, even though it too
needs refinement. In footnote four, citing the majority opinion in
Texas v. Johnson,'89 Justice White observed that the "fighting words"
doctrine applies to a "direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs." 9 0° Drawing upon this standard, and upon Brandenshould require plaintiff to show, inter alia, that he or she understood that the insult was
intended to demean through reference to race and that a reasonable person would recognize it as an insult).
186 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). But see In re Welfare of
S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978).
187 See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
188 Cf Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring):
If these words had been addressed by one citizen to another, face to face
and in a hostile manner, I would have no doubt that they would be "fighting words." But the situation may be different where such words are addressed to a police officer trained to exercise a higher degree of restraint
than the average citizen.
Most of the "fighting words" cases involve language directed against police officers,
and the arrests are quite difficult to justify. See Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free
Speech, 58 WAsH. U. L.Q. 531, 566-69 (1980). The lower courts are sharply divided on the
question whether such "fighting words" can support a criminal conviction. Michael G.
Walsh, Annot., Insulting Words AddressedDirectly to Police Officer As Breach of Peace orDisorderly
Conduct 14 A.L.R. 4th 1252 (1982).
189 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
190 RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2553 n.4 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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burg v. Ohio,' 91 he said that burning a cross at a political rally would
19 2
"almost certainly be protected expression."
While imperfect, Justice White's formulation of the fighting
words doctrine has the merit of avoiding a purely pugilistic analysis
which would find Chaplinsky-type injury if, but only if, the utterance
would cause both a reasonable (or average) person and the actual addressee to respond with immediate violence.
Both prongs of the pugilistic analysis are problematic. First, it
seems wrong to protect the actual strong victim who is willing to fight
above the weaker or less aggressive victim. As Professor Shea argued
almost twenty years ago, there is something deeply anomalous about a
test that would "permit a state to penalize a speaker who insults a
burly construction worker' 9 3 while forbidding the punishment of the
reviler of a wheelchair-bound quadriplegic"' 9 4 or the fourteen-yearold defendant in S.L.J.195
Focusing not on the person to whom remarks are addressed, but
on an abstract "reasonable" or "average" person, provides little help as
long as we remain within the pugilistic analysis. 196 Consider who this
"reasonable person" will be. The definition will exclude most men
and women in society even if we leave size and physical ability out of
the equation; most men (maybe I am wrong, perhaps it is just millions
of men) and women do not respond to insults with fists.' 97 To administer this test and allow it to help the helpless, the "reasonable person"
would have to be the stereotype of a man in a rowdy bar (who has yet to
drink enough to lose the mantle of reasonableness). The symbolic
impropriety of protecting women, for example, by using the stereotype of any man as a proxy-all under the label of reasonableness or
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
193 Under this view, the state could arguably not punish such statements if they were
made on the telephone. See Anniskette v. State, 489 P.2d 1012, 1014-15 (Alaska 1971)
191

192

(available cooling-off period defeats fighting words finding).
194 Thomas F. Shea, "Don'tBother to Smile When You Call Me That "--FightingWords and
the First Amendment, 63 KY L.J. 1, 2 (1975).
195 Nonetheless, that seems to be the implication of Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
523 (1972) (requiring that fighting words convictions be based on circumstances in which
the actual addressee was likely to fight). But cf Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200
(1966) (use of subjective standard is erroneous because it "involves calculations as to the
boiling point of a particular person or a particular group").
196
See generally Shea, supra note 194 (recommending a focus on the average person).
197

Gard, supra note 188, at 554-56; cf KENT GREENAWALT,

SPEECH,

CRIME AND THE USES

oF LANGUAGE 295-98 (1989) (fighting words standard is gendered); Lawrence, Campus,
supra note 6, at 454 (paradigm is based on white male point of view); Lawrence, Hate!
Crimes, supra note 6, at 710 (standard is probably gendered); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 42 (1992) (fighting words
exception open to "criticism as a hopeless anachronism that canonizes the macho code of
barroom brawls").
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the "average person"-ought to send analysts back to the drawing
board.
Thus, Justice White is to be applauded for recognizing that the
fighting words doctrine applies either to a direct personal insult or an
invitation to exchange fisticuffs. As my analogy with the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress makes clear, however, the personal insult should be required to be particularly offensive or
outrageous before sanctions are imposed, lest the net capture too
much.
Second, as discussed previously, the direct personal insult approach need not concentrate on all direct personal insults; it could
focus on, or offer greater penalties for, racial insults. Justice White's
opinion strongly agrees with this approach.
Some commentators have argued that the fighting words doctrine has primarily been used against people of color; 98 for example,
against black defendants for cursing white police officers. If this were
true, it would be important to confine the prohibition of racial insults
to those directed against people of color. The evidence for the commentators' claim, however, seems extremely speculative. What it establishes persuasively is only that discrimination occurs when people
of color insult white police officers, and the rule I have already suggested, that police officers should be required to withstand such insults without retaliating, regardless of the arrestee's race, would solve
this problem.
Nonetheless, a related notion-that only racial or ethnic insults
directed against members of groups that are historically oppressed because of their race, color, or national and ethnic origin' 99 should be
subject to prohibition-has considerable merit. Racial or ethnic insults directed at non-Jewish white Americans simply do not have the
capacity to cause the same type of harm as insults directed against
2 00
subordinated groups.
Notice that, by this standard, the ordinance at issue in R.A.V. is
defective because it appears to apply to racial insults across the board,
regardless of whether they are directed at members of advantaged or
198 Gard, supra note 188, at 566, 571; Strossen, supra note 22, at 512; cf.Strossen, supra,
at 556-58 (hate speech rules primarily enforced against people of color). The evidence put
forward by these commentators is quite thin, though of course their conclusion may be
correct.
199 See Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2357; see also Lawrence, Campus, supra note 6, at 450
n.82 (best version of doctrine would not protect persons vilified on basis of membership in
dominant majority groups).
200 See Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2361-63. Of course, a verbal insult delivered in a way
that might be reasonably interpreted as a threat ought not be protected, regardless of its
racial or ethnic content. Moreover, if the proposal were designed for a college campus
and the objective were to promote civility, one might regulate a broader class of racial and
ethnic insults. See also infra note 268.
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disadvantaged groups. From the perspective of outsider jurisprudence, one would have to evaluate whether this defect in the St. Paul
ordinance would be likely to lead to the selective, racially biased enforcement that some commentators claim has plagued the enforcement of other "fighting words" statutes. 20 ' From the perspective of
outsider jurisprudence, the ordinance would be substantially improved if it were limited to speech harming victims from historically
oppressed groups. For the Court, however, the introduction of a historical oppression requirement would be an indefensible form of content discrimination, despite the fact that the sting of epithets is greater
when directed at members of disadvantaged groups.202 From my perspective, outsider jurisprudence is correct to call for the prohibition
of targeted racial insults. I will leave the particulars of my own somewhat complicated proposal about racial fighting words for the
203
footnotes.
201

Even if there were selective enforcement in otherjurisdictions, the problem might

not exist in St. Paul. On the other hand, the failure to make clear in the ordinance that
insults directed against non-Jewish white Americans are not punishable gives courts discretion without which they may be better off.
202
See BELL HooKs, BLACK LooKs: RACE AND REPRESENTATION 15 (1992) ("The prejudicial feelings some blacks may express about whites are in no way linked to a system of
domination that affords us any power to coercively control the lives and well-being of white
folks.").
203 My proposal about racial fighting words is somewhat different than those given
elsewhere, though (apart from what appears in the text) my defense of it against first
amendment objections would not go much beyond what already appears in the large
literature:
Speech or other expression should be punishable if it (a) is intended
to insult and stigmatize an individual (except for public officials, including
police officers or their private counterparts, and public figures) on the basis of his or her belonging to a group historically oppressed because of its
race, color, ethnicity, or national origin; and (b) is either addressed directly
to the individual whom it insults and stigmatizes, or addressed or distributed in a way that is ultimately communicated to the individual; and (c)
makes use of words or symbols that insult and stigmatize an individual on
the basis of his or her belonging to a group historically oppressed because
of its race, color, ethnicity or national origin; unless (d) the speech or other
expression is provoked by fighting words, threats, or violent conduct.
The same rules should apply when the insults are directed at families or, in some
cases, small groups of individuals. See infra note 269. Approaches to the problem of gender insults, for example, should be somewhat different. Developing that notion is beyond
the scope of this article.
This proposal about racial fighting words is designed for all contexts, including high
school and college campuses, in which the question is whether sanctions, criminal or
otherwise, are appropriate. If a campus is private, the first amendment does not apply, and
the policy can be evaluated on its merits without being held hostage to the often slapdash
first amendment doctrine of the Rehnquist Court.
If the context, however, is that of a public university or a criminal statute, the Court's
decisions must be respected. In those contexts, my proposal provides a criticism rather
than a practical proposal for action because it diverges from the Court's ultimate understanding of fighting words doctrine. Some similarities will remain, of course.
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The remaining question is whether racist speech that does not
target any particular individual,2 0 4 but instead insults a racial group by
means that are "persecutorial, hateful, and degrading,"20 5 is protected
First, the Court will insist on words or other symbolic conduct of an insulting and
outrageous character. Second, the Court will presumably impose an intent requirement.
A person who uses insulting and stigmatizing words in a bad joke will not be subject to
punishment. On the other hand, under the proposal the words themselves or the symbolic
conduct would be sufficient evidence of intent in a wide variety of circumstances, even in
the face of denials by the perpetrator. Burning a cross on a black family's lawn would be
punishable even if the defendant insisted and credibly testified that he had believed that it
was all in good fun.
Of course, that is an easy case. From my perspective, the question of whether intent
should be required is a close one. I do not think people should be punished for insensitivity without accompanying malice. But I fear the intent requirement could be used to exonerate too many people undeservedly. In forging a compromise, I would recommend that
the use of words or symbols that insult and stigmatize an individual on the basis of his or
her belonging to a group historically oppressed because of its race, color, or national and

ethnic origin should create a strong presumption of bad intent. This presumption, however, may violate due process in the criminal context. See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391
(1991); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
Third, some racial insults directed, for example, by one member of a historically disadvantaged group at another member of the same group may insult, but not stigmatize, within
the meaning of my proposal. My sense is that a racial insult directed by a European American against an African American or a Latino/a usually functions differently than do racial
insults hurled by members of the same racial group at each other.
Fourth, face-to-face insults would certainly be covered. But there are a range of other
possible situations. Public stigmatization of an individual without his or her presence, in
circumstances where the individual would likely learn of it, is also likely to be covered. I do
not think it should matter, for example, whether the victim of a racial slur happens to be
present when a speaker includes the slur in a public speech or if the black family happens
to be home when perpetrators burn a cross on the lawn across the street; perhaps it would
matter to the Court.
More controversial still would be a circumstance in which an individual distributes a
leaflet to a small group of friends containing a racist epithet directed at a particular individual, but with a directive not to republish the statement. If the statement is republished
and the victim learns of it, is the perpetrator responsible? I would say yes, by analogy to
defamation law. If you plan to defame someone, you are responsible for the damage
caused by republication of the defamation whether or not it was anticipated. To be sure, a
direct stigmatizing insult may be more injurious, but the delivery of the insult is foreseeably
likely to cause injury one way or another and the perpetrator who intentionally insults and
stigmatizes on the basis of race deserves little inquiry into the particular context and circumstances. Nonetheless, the Court may require a more direct communication. A middle
ground position would require that it be reasonably foreseeable that the offending statement would be communicated to the victim.
The Court would not permit punishment for oral statements made by one friend to
another that ultimately get back to the victim no matter how outrageous the statement. My
proposal would permit punishment in such circumstances.
Finally, as discussed in the text, a showing of injury should not be required, and only
stigmatizing insults directed at members of historically disadvantaged groups should be
subject to sanctions. In my view, the Court would permit the former, but not the latter.
204 The line between targeted and nontargeted racist speech is not self-defining. I
mean the distinction to be substantive and not formal. Therefore, a perpetrator who addressed a general insult about Asian Americans to an Asian American in a way that insulted
and stigmatized that person would have engaged in targeted speech even though the victim's name was not used. See also infra note 269.
205 Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2357.
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by the first amendment. Should such racist speech, uttered in public
or private, be subject to punitive sanctions? Justice White seems confident that it should be protected, 20 6 and practitioners of outsider's jurisprudence are divided on the issue.2 0 7 To approach the question, I
need to introduce my own story about the first amendment and the
meaning of America.
VI
DISSENT AND THE MEANING OF AMERICA

My story is not Justice Scalia's tale about a content neutral government, nor is it about the town hall meeting or even a robust marketplace of ideas; still less is it about liberty, equality, self-realization,
respect, dignity, autonomy, or even tolerance. My story-my partial
truth-supposes that the first amendment protects the dissenters, the
unorthodox, and the outcasts. On this understanding, the first
amendment's major purpose and function in the American polity is to
protect and sometimes affirmatively to sponsor the individualism, the
rebelliousness, the anti-authoritarianism, the spirit of nonconformity
2 08
within us all.

But the purpose and function of the first amendment goes beyond the protection of outsiders. For example, on my understanding,
the first amendment also has special regard for the press as an institution intended to operate as a check on corruption and other abuses in
private and public life, whether or not such abuses affect people on
society's margin of power; it has special regard for the speech of the
powerful when it dissents from our existing customs, habits, institutions, or authorities. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the most important or effective criticism of abuse of power will come from the
powerful; for one thing, they are unlikely to criticize those aspects of
the system that benefit them as a class. In some respects, the dissent
story combines an insider's and an outsider's perspective.
According to the dissent story, decisionmakers in millions of
small and large institutions often abuse the power they exercise. It is
in their self-interest to defend what they do, while it is in society's
interest to check their abuses of power. The value of dissent is clear if
we believe that wielders of power (whether it is public or private) have
structural and material advantages in defending their position and
206 See supra text accompanying notes 188-90.
207 Compare, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 6 (advocating criminalization of such speech)
with Lawrence, Campus, supra note 6 (arguing for a narrower proposal).
208
1 have discussed this perspective in greater detail elsewhere, see generally SHIFFN,

supra note 65 passim, but I did not discuss racist speech or outsider jurisprudence in that
work.
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that their use of power is more often self-serving than they admit20 9
even to themselves.
To be sure, dissent may often be unfair in that it can be fueled
and distorted by envy of those higher up in a particular hierarchy.
The threat of dissent can also chill useful exercises of power. But
when all is said and done, dissent and the threat of dissent make hierarchy less oppressive. Dissent communicates the fears, hopes, and aspirations of the less powerful to those in power. It sometimes chills
the abuse of power; it sometimes paves the way for change by those in
power or of those in power. The democratic value of dissent in this
connection transcends that of dissent registered on periodic visits to
the voting booth or rare court battles; it is a part of the daily dialectic
2 10
of power relations in the society.
So understood, the dissent story is not only a practical story about
checks and balances, but also a romantic story of a society symbolized
in large part by its protection of dissenters. From this perspective,
racist speech that is not targeted at a specific individual presents a
difficult first amendment issue. On the one hand, as David Cole
writes, "[p] roponents of racist speech-Klan members, Nazis, and the
21 1
like-are also a minority, and a particularly unpopular one at that."
Moreover, it seems likely that members of the Klan and similarly racist
groups perceive themselves as beleaguered, stigmatized, and
212
marginalized.
On the other hand, nontargeted racist speech implicates dissenting values on both sides. Although vocal proponents of racism are a
minority group despised by many, they also state aloud views that are
widely though privately held in society.213 Hate speakers may differ

from their fellow citizens only in their willingness to voice, baldly and
209

In this sense, the dissent model is ahistorical. On the other hand, the question of

what counts as dissent in a particular society is necessarily contingent. Indeed, the ability
of a regime-including the American constitutional regime-to define "dissent" might
partially rob the term of its liberating potential.
210 For insightful, but quite different, perspectives on power, see KENNEDY, supra note
9; Nancy Hartsock, Foucault on Power. A Theory For Women?, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM

(LindaJ. Nicholson ed., 1990).
211 Cole, supra, note 6, at 67.
212 There is an important difference between organizations like the Klan and individual perpetrators of racist speech. The Klan has a history of violence. One wonders if the
Federal Bureau of Investigation has infiltrated the Klan with the same ferocity it infiltrated
the communists. There remains the possibility that a conspiracy to advocate violence is
treated differently than individual advocacy. The former may not require a showing of
imminent lawless action. Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974)
(dictum that urging others to engage in violence now or in the future satisfies constitutional standard).
213 Gale, supra note 6, at 141 ("Racist, sexist, or-perhaps most clearly-homophobic
expression is... far more likely to represent an overt expression of covert, or thinly veiled,
majoritarian views."). The National Opinion Research Center reports that three of four
whites believe that black and Latino/a people are more likely than whites to prefer living
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vociferously, what they think.2 14 Moreover, expressions of racial vilification can create a repressive environment in which the speech of
people of color is chilled or not heard. 2 15 A cross burning directed at
the home of a black family is not an act of dissent against a powerful
status quo; it is a threatening act of power against a victim. In a society
in which race has been and continues to be used as a means of perpetuating inequality, the initiator of racist speech further aggravates the
position of the subordinated. Racist speech causes many well-documented harms:2 16 it is an assault on the dignity of people of color; it
humiliates and causes emotional distress, sometimes with physical
manifestations; it helps spread racial prejudice, not only stigmatizing
people of color in the eyes of the societally dominant race, but also in
the eyes of the victims themselves, inspiring self-hatred, isolation, and
impairment of the capacity for interpersonal relationships; and, fi2 17
nally, it frequently creates the conditions for violence.
Because both aggressors and victims can be characterized, with
some accuracy, as dissenters, the dissent story underscores the difficulty of the first amendment status of racist speech. On the one hand,
the dissent perspective seeks to protect those with popularly disdained
views and, in an important respect, this includes those who publicly
express racist views. On the other hand, the dissent perspective seeks
to assure that those who are out of power or lower in a hierarchy have
means of protesting their status and combating the inevitable abuses
of power by higher ups. A regime that is blind to the importance of
assuring that disadvantaged groups are not intimidated will contain,
as its status quo, substantial corruption and abuse.
on welfare and that they are less hard working, less intelligent, and less patriotic. Poll Finds
Whites Use Stereotypes, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 1991, at B10.
214
See Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptoy
Challenges,35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 21, 75 (1993) ("While 'dominative racists,' persons who
express bigotry and hatred openly, are less common than they were twenty-five years ago,
they have been replaced, in substantial measure, by closet or 'aversive' racists, persons who
continue to hold negative stereotypes of minorities and wish to avoid them."); Sheri Lynn
Johnson, UnconsciousRacism and the CriminalLaw, 73 CoRNmL L. Rxv. 1016, 1027-28 (1988)
(citing literature from Freudians, cognitive psychologists, and sociologists); Sheri Lynn
Johnson, RacialImagery in CriminalCases, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1739 (1993). See also sources cited
infra note 252.
215
See Delgado, Words that Wound, supranote 6, at 144-46, 179; Delgado, CampusAntiracism, supra note 6, at 379, 385; Gale, supra note 6, at 148; Lawrence, Campus, supra note 6, at
452-56, 468. See generally Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE LJ. 1559 (1989)
(discussing the impact of overt or subtle indications of prejudice upon blacks and the role
of law in those prejudicial displays).
216 See, e.g., Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 6; Kretzmer, supra note 6, at 462-67;
Lawrence, Campus, supra note 6, at 452-56, 457-66, 482-83; Matsuda, supra note 6, at 232641.
217 See sources cited supra note 215. I do not suggest that the harms mentioned in the
text are exhaustive.
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How does one resolve conflicts between, or within, different stories about the first amendment? When values conflict, philosophers
may debate abstractly about which course to follow, but I think the
legal community tends to focus on the probable consequences of such
stories (and the regulations seen to follow from them) for the flourishing of human beings, with a background understanding that all
persons are entitled to respect and dignity.
A.

Contribution to Public Dialogue

One could argue that racist speech makes a contribution to public dialogue. For purposes of this discussion, I shall rely on Mari Matsuda's definition of racist speech, namely that it is a message of racial
inferiority, that it is directed against a historically oppressed group,
2 18
and that it is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading.
Racist speakers seek to persuade people that government (and
others) should not treat all persons with equal concern and respect.
If our legal system has even a prayer of claiming to be legitimate, however, it must start from the premise that all citizens are worthy of
equal concern and respect.2 19 Racist speech, such as that of the Klan,
218 Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2357. I am sensitive to Karst's powerful argument, see
Karst, supra note 6, passim, that it is dangerous to privilege speech based in "reason" above
speech based in emotion. In using Matsuda's definition, however, I do not endorse a reason-emotion dichotomy. Indeed, I believe emotional speech is necessarily cognitive and
that reason and emotion cannot be easily separated. When Jesse Jackson argues that the
black community should take responsibility for its contribution to crime in general and the
drug trade in particular, he communicates his message with passion: "We are far more
threatened by the dope than the rope." Bob Herbert, Blacks Killing Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
20, 1993, atA23 (referring to lynchings as a symbol of racism). The passion is a part of his
message, and it is not the antithesis of reason.
Jackson's speech is also, of course, not an instance of persecutorial, hateful, and degrading speech. What marks out the persecutorial and hateful aspects of communication
for sanction is not that they are emotional, but that they implicate moral culpability which
ought to be present before sanctions are imposed.
219

RONALD DwoRaN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 190 (1985) (Government must "treat all

those in its charge as equals, that is, as entitled to its equal concern and respect."); RONALD
DWoRKIN, TAING RPasnrs SEmOuSLY 272-73 (1977) ("Government must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect.") (emphasis added); C.
EDwIN BAKER, HuMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 278 (1989) (equal concern and
respect for person's autonomy required). This principle is a moral principle, not merely a
political principle-not just a basis for political compromise or political unity, but a moral
starting point.
Although I think that some such principle is one of the minimum conditions for legitimate government, I do not think the principle can generate the sweeping conclusions that
many of its advocates educe. For a more extensive explication of this position, see Steven
Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1103 (1983).
Moreover, I think this argument might well be regarded by committed racists as circular. For example, most liberals would claim that the compulsory education of eight-yearolds and our denying them access to many societal privileges and benefits does not deny
them equal concern or respect but rather is a recognition of their different circumstances.
Some racists would similarly say that unequal treatment of people of color is appropriate to
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therefore promotes governmental illegitimacy 220 and makes no "contribution" to public political dialogue. 22 1 In this limited context, the
best test of truth is the system's foundational premise of equality not
whether racist speech can emerge triumphant in the marketplace of
22 2
ideas.
their circumstances and therefore does not deny them equal concern or respect as human
beings. To answer this racist argument requires more than the invocation of a principle of
equal concern and respect; it requires a substantive understanding of the principle. I do
not propose to refute the racist here. Certainly, our legal system has rejected the racist
understanding. Nonracist equal concern and respect is what the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments clearly require. Amar, supra note 6. In general, I do not claim to offer
arguments that would appeal to a racist.
220 The position of communists is more complicated. Communists argue that the system is so illegitimate and its evils so serious that it deserves to be overthrown. If they are
correct, their contribution to the marketplace of ideas is valuable. There is, of course, a
risk that an attempted overthrow might occur in circumstances where the evils are not
sufficiently serious. Current law tries to address that possibility. See Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969). If the Ku Klux Klan succeeds, in contrast, it is inevitably the case that
the system is illegitimate.
221 For detailed presentation of a similar argument, see Harel, supra note 6. Robert
Post argues, on the other hand, that the legitimacy of the system depends upon democratic
dialogue including speech that questions the assumptions of the system. Post, supra note 6,
at 280-85. Although complete agreement among the citizens is not possible, id. at 281, 283,
it is possible to subject the "political and social order to public opinion" and "to instill a
sense of self-determination." Id. at 282. Post concedes that the achievement of "autonomous self-determination for both majority and minority is a complex and contingent question, dependent upon historical circumstances." Id. at 283. It seems plain to me that
people of color in general and millions of others (perhaps most) do not have the sense of
self-determination that Post argues is a necessary feature of democracy. Populist frustration about the failure of politicians to do the work of the people illustrates the point. It
seems hard, therefore, to understand why racist speech causing harm should be constitutionally immunized in order to protect a self-determination that does not exist. More generally, Post denies that equality trumps dialogue. Id. at 292-93. Apart from invoking an
argument about the difficulty of finding someone to interpret equality and positing that
equality requires self-rule, Post's argument against a substantive theory of equality is that it
would interfere with self-determination. This is puzzling, however. Clearly, Post would not
permit racial discrimination (or slavery) to be legitimized as a product of democratic dialogue, yet to limit the possible results of democratic dialogue is to limit both the reality of
and the sense of self-determination. Of course, Post might respond that equality and other
human rights can limit the output of public dialogue (thus limiting self-determination),
but not the dialogue itself. In the end, however, it is easy to understand why self-determination is treated as an important value; it is difficult to understand why it would deserve
the exalted place Post would provide. That we should strive for democracy is an insufficient answer because those who strive to limit public dialogue in the name of human rights
also claim to be operating from democratic principles. Any definition of democracy is
contested.
222 Many, of course, would object that courts should not evaluate the contribution of
particular categories of speech to the marketplace of ideas, see, e.g., Massey, supra note 6, at
113, but the courts have certainly done so in the context of fighting words, Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), obscenity, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 61 (1973), and defamation, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
Determining that a category of speech is at odds with a foundational premise of the system
is not only consistent with these precedents, but also less open ended.
Massey contends that "[p]ublic discourse cannot be defined normatively, for any such
attempt is necessarily hinged to some ideological notion of what our collective identity
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Contributions to dialogue might arise in other ways, however. Racist speech can potentially be intertwined with an exposure of real
evils that deserve to be remedied. More important, racist speech certainly stimulates responses that contribute to the democratic dialogue.
It may contribute to "the clearer perception and livelier impression of
truth produced by its collision with error."223 Moreover, racist speech
inadvertently adds a valuable fact to the marketplace of ideas: the rest
224
of us learn that extreme racists are active in society.
Although racist speech seems to have some minimal marketplace
value, it is much more difficult to argue that this value outweighs the
harm that racist speech causes. 225 As an African American father once
said to me when I spoke about the contribution of racist speech to the
226
democratic dialogue, "Tell that to my seven-year-old daughter."
B. The Right of the Speaker
An important feature of the first amendment is its protection of
2 27 Oppothe autonomy (or self-expression or liberty) of the speaker.
nents of racist speech regulations can argue that such regulations unreasonably impinge on the right of the speaker to autonomy,
liberty, 228 or self-expression,2 29 but this argument has substantial

weaknesses. Recall that one of the minimum conditions of a legitishould be." Massey, supra note 6, at 113. My argument is that we must be hinged to an
ideology of equality of persons, or else our government has no claim to our respect. That
is, a democratic system presupposes some minimum conditions of our collective identity.
But see supra note 219 (discussing the limitation on the equality principle).
223 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, reprinted in ESSENTIAL WORs OFJOHN STUART MiLu 269
(Max Lerner ed., 1965). Of course, it may do exactly the opposite. See Kretzmer, supra
note 6, at 462-65.
224
For some there is a deep-seated ambivalence concerning racist speech. A desire for
racist speech to go away coincides with a desire for the racist "to just come out and say it."
For some, the harm of racist speech coincides with some vindication in that racism has
been exposed. Some would argue that they would rather bear racist insults in order to
know who the racists are, but they, in myjudgment, are an atypically hardy bunch.
225 For discussion of the harm, see sources cited supra note 215.
226 Cf Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 6, at 146 ("Because they constantly hear
racist messages, minority children, not surprisingly, come to question their competence,
intelligence, and worth ....
If the majority 'defines them and their parents as no good,
inadequate, dirty, incompetent, and stupid,' the child will find it difficult not to accept
those judgments.") (quoting K. KENISTON, ALL OUR C1ILDREN: THE AMERICAN FAMILY
UNDER PREssuRE 33 (1977)); see also id. at 147 (describing the defenses that people of color
develop in response to racial insults).
227 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 219 (emphasizing liberty); DAVID A.J. RicHARDs, ToLERATION AND THE CONSTrtrTON (1986) (emphasizing autonomy); Martin H. Redish, The Value

of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. Rxv. 591 (1982) (emphasizing self-expression). For analysis of
some of the confusion surrounding the notion of autonomy, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REv. 875 (1994).
228

E.g., BAKER, supra note 219.

Expressions of racism may further self-expression while at the same time inhibiting
human development. See Delgado, Campus Antiracism, supra note 6, at 379 ("[S]ocial science writers hold that making racist remarks impairs, rather than promotes, the growth of
229

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:43

mate system is that it assumes that all citizens are worthy of equal concern and respect. It is hard to understand why a polity governed by
this assumption would regard it as vital to offer constitutional support
for individual preferences that contradict the major premise on which
the polity is constituted. 230 Moreover, the racist speaker is in a poor
position to claim a right derived from the principle that all citizens
deserve to be treated with equal respect or concern because the
speaker wholeheartedly denies this principle. 23 1 The racist speaker,
then, is practically estopped from using this first amendment
2 32
theory.
Perhaps, however, principles of estoppel should play no role.
Even if the speaker might be inconsistent in raising the right,233 the
system might not be inconsistent in respecting it.234 Moreover, the
the person who makes them, by encouraging rigid, dichotomous thinking and impeding
moral development.").
230 This does not mean that preferences in conflict with other principles or amendments are suspect. My claim is that the principle of equal concern and respect is foundational in the sense that it is necessary for a legitimate constitution. That could not be said
of federalism or separation of powers, for example.
On the problems associated with taking people's preferences as given, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Democracy and Shifting Preferences, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 196 (David Copp et
al. eds., 1993); Joshua Cohen, Moral Pluralism and PoliticalConsensus, in id. at 270.
231
A racist speaker need not necessarily argue this way, however. See supra note 219.
232 The claim of communists is different in this respect. Communists affirm the equality principle; they deny it has been carried out. To the extent that communists argue
against free speech, it seems to me that they are in the same position as the Ku Klux Klan;
nonetheless, the harm of their speech is not in the same league as racist speech. As to the
marketplace value of communist speech, see supra note 220.
It might be argued that, because the principle of equal concern and respect is subject
to varying interpretations, an argument of this sort has serious "slippery slope" problems. I
would note first that this objection does not deny that the speech of the Klan is at odds
with the principle of equal respect for persons. Rather, it worries that the same argument
will be used in damaging ways in other contexts. As a practical matter, I think the objection is unfounded. Nor need I rely on the limited form that the argument plays in the
analysis that follows.
The argument that creating an unprotected category of racist speech should be
avoided because it would lead to other unprotected categories has to suppose that judges
who would otherwise not have created new categories would do so because of the racist
speech category. Apart from the speculative character of the argument, I am not prepared
to assume that the creation of a new category of unprotected speech that followed from or
bore a close resemblance to a racist speech category would necessarily be bad. It seems
that the issue should turn on the facts-as it should with racist speech. For slippery slope
arguments, see Linzer, supra note 6, at 205-19; Post, supra note 6, at 315-17. For discussion
of the character of slippery slope arguments, see Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99
HAv. L. REv. 361 (1985).
233 Speakers who reject the premise of the system might argue that having been saddled with its disadvantages, they should not be denied its benefits. The problem with this
argument is that from the perspective of the system, they have not been disadvantaged;
they had no entitlement to mistreat others, and they have not themselves been otherwise
mistreated.
234
Cf JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 220 (1971) ("The conclusion, then, is that
while an intolerant [religious] sect does not itself have title to complain of intolerance, its
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system could condemn the content of the expression, but nevertheless
support the speech right. The argument would be that respect for
speakers demands that they be permitted to autonomously choose
good or evil, right or wrong. Autonomy of this sort is certainly important, but its value is not absolute; if respect for persons demanded
absolute autonomous choice, persons would have the right to choose
to murder. Of course, our system does not permit that, nor does it
permit the use of heroin even when its use does not directly harm
others. These examples are, of course, restrictions of conduct and not
speech, but speech autonomy is hardly absolute. In the arena of
speech, for example, our system limits the autonomous choice to
make defamatory statements in some circumstances. 235 The basic
problem with the autonomy argument is that it cannot show that the
value of individual autonomy outweighs the harm caused by racist
speech. 236 Nor can it show that the idea of respect for persons demands any particular weighing of the competing values in this context. 23 7 Any confidence that the value of free speech in this context

outweighs the harm thus requires placing a thumb on the scales.
C.

Political Identity and the First Amendment

Many would claim, however, that the point of the first amendment is that a thumb in favor of free speech should be placed on the
balancing scales. I do not propose to retrace the question of whether
balancing is itself desirable under the first amendment. It is certainly
the reigning paradigm of first amendment law.238 Similarly, but as is
less frequently noted, it is not the case that free speech invariably gets
freedom should be restricted only when the tolerant sincerely and with reason believe that
their own security and that of the institutions of liberty are in danger.").
235
For examples of such limitations, see supra note 108.
236 For discussion of the harm, see sources cited in supra note 215. To get at the point
another way, ifJohn Rawls' "veil of ignorance," RAWLs, supra note 234, at 136-42, yields the
principle that the basic structure of society should be arranged to maximize the chances of
the least advantaged members in society (the "difference principle," id. at 75-83), it seems
clear that decisionmakers applying such a principle would seek laws against racist speech
targeting historically disadvantaged groups-unless, as I will suggest, such laws would make
matters worse.
It might be objected, however, that liberty rights take priority over the difference principle, e.g., id. at 243-51, so that the racist's right of free speech should prevail. But this
objection is flawed. The justification of the priority of the liberty principle over the difference principle depends on the assumption that such a priority secures the primary good of
self-respect. Id. at 543-48. This assumption is particularly dubious with respect to hate
speech. More interesting is the argument that the audience, including members of the
disadvantaged class, have an interest in hearing such speech.
237 Although conceptions of respect and autonomy are not without meaning, the same
problem arises in many other contexts as well. See generallyShiffrin, supra note 219, at 114770 (1983) (rejecting the neutrality principle as a basic principle of government).
238 See generally Smrnur,, supra note 65, at 9-45; Frederick Schauer, Categories and the
First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAn. L. Rxv. 265 (1981).
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privileged weighing in balancing cases; speech is favored in most contexts, but it is not favored over all other values.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 23 9 for example, the Court fashioned a
set of rules to resolve the conflict between preserving individual reputation and the freedoms of speech and press. Rather than supposing
that free speech was more important than reputation, the Court spoke
of the need for rules which would come to a "proper accommodation"240 of competing interests, both of which it obviously regarded as
important, 241 and neither of which it explicitly preferred in the abstract. Although the Court has often stated that free speech gets extraordinary weight in the balancing process, those statements must be
read against a broader background which reveals that the weight afforded to speech in practice turns on context. Contrast, for example,
the different weights afforded free speech values in the categories of
obscenity242 and pornography. 243 The extent to which free speech
rights get extra weight in the first amendment balance, then, is con244
text sensitive.
Why is this point so frequently missed? In part, because of wishful thinking: people want to believe their country is just, and they also
believe justice depends upon a robust first amendment. For many,
what is unique about this country is that it cherishes and protects free
speech. Indeed, a major reason why people seem to value free speech
(beyond the instrumental reasons) is that their sense of political identity, of belonging, is bound up with the first amendment. The protection of racist speech allows people to maintain a symbolic commitment
to free speech and, more generally, to reaffirm the notion that we live
in a free country. This symbolism is not entirely unattractive; it is important that citizens take pride in constitutional values. 245 Thus, the
239
240

418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Id. at 325.
241
The Court indicated both that it would not lightly require states to abandon the
interests in compensating individuals for defamatory falsehoods, id. at 341, and that it was
"especially anxious to assure to the freedoms of speech and press that 'breathing space'
essential to their fruitful exercise." Id. at 342 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)).
242
Strict scrutiny is not applied. See supra text accompanying notes 89-104.

243 American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affid, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986) (when content discrimination is present, anti-pornography ordinance is automatically unconstitutional).
244
SHIFRUN, supra note 65, at 9-45.
245
It is certainly important from the centrist perspective fostered by that of constitution building. I also think it is important from the perspective of the left, but that is a far
more complicated issue. See generally Steven Shiffrin, The Politicsof the Mass Media and the
Free Speech Principle 69 IND. L.J. 689 (1994) (arguing that the left benefits from the first
amendment even though the content produced by the institutional media is generally
hostile).

1994]

RACIST SPEECH

powerful appeal of first amendment rhetoric 246 serves a significant
purpose.
Nonetheless, free speech is often compromised (consider again
the rules governing defamation and obscenity) without major loss to
the first amendment's symbolic importance. If free speech can be accommodated when it clashes with reputation or sexual mores, it is not
easy to appreciate why it should stand absolute, or be privileged in the
balance, in a contest with racial equality. As in these other special
cases, the sacrifice of first amendment symbolism would be partial,
not total. Also, while it is important to maintain the symbolism of free
speech, it is also important to maintain the attractive symbolism of
racial equality and an anti-racist 247 public morality. Moreover, it
seems difficult to justify tolerating real harm in the name of promoting symbolism.
D.

The Effectiveness of Regulating Nontargeted Hate Speech

The first amendment contains many values; I have discussed a few
of the more important ones. I have argued at length that the impact
on free speech values of racist speech regulation should be considered
palpable, but, nonetheless, tolerable. This conclusion, however, depends upon the assumption that racist speech regulation would be
effective in achieving its goals, and that assumption, unfortunately, is
open to serious question.
One important goal of the regulation of nontargeted racist
speech is simply to prevent such speech and thereby eliminate its
harms. Another goal of such regulation is to affirm an anti-racist public morality which over the long term could persuade people (including the privately prejudiced) to abandon racism. There is substantial
room for worry, however, that the imposition of punitive sanctions
248
against nontargeted racist speech would harm people of color.

Some, indeed much, racist speech would no doubt be deterred,
and that is an important result. However, some racist speech would
not be wholly deterred, but rather transformed into an even more
2 49
effective yet unprosecutable Willie-Horton-like "code" speech.
Even if all explicit racist vilification were eliminated in American soci246
See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion .... ").
247
Many of those who maintain the innocent assumption, see, e.g., Flax, supra note 124,
that we can have it all, are those who do not share in the risks of failure, and who have not
directly experienced the harms associated with racist speech. But see sources cited supra
note 6.
248
I do not think this would be true in all circumstances. See infra note 270.
249
See, e.g., CosE, supra note 4; FnAGIN & SlKEs, supra note 4.
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ety, racism and much unprosecutable implicitly racist speech would
still remain. That speech is not only part of the basic fabric of social
life, but also quite harmful. Even if a program against the speech of
racial vilification were entirely successful, then, only the tip of the iceberg would have been liquidated. Moreover, it is important to recognize that much racial vilification will not be deterred. Of particular
concern in this connection is public racist speech. Self-styled "patriots" who think that racist speech sanctions violate the very meaning of
America would be induced to defy the regulations;250 they would act
on the belief that whiteness is part of the core of America, and that
the first amendment necessarily protects expressions of white
superiority.
Unfortunately, millions of Americans hold the view that the prohibition of such expression violates a precious constitutional freedom.
As a consequence, public racists might become martyrs25 1 and governmental intervention might be resented. This resentment could aggravate existing racism, or be transformed into new racism by
demagogues.
The social science literature concerning racism contains a substantial debate about the extent to which animosity toward people of
color fuels support for policies that negatively affect people of color.
One group of theorists argues that a form of "symbolic racism" is of
major explanatory value in understanding contemporary racial politics. 25 2 Symbolic racism "represents a form of resistance to change in

the racial status quo based on moral feelings that blacks violate such
traditional American values as individualism and self-reliance, the
work ethic, obedience and discipline." 253 As a consequence, these
theorists argue, prejudice "remains in this century, as it was in the last,
a potent influence in many political choices." 25 4 An important related
claim of these theorists is that the opposition of millions of citizens to
programs designed to benefit people of color frequently has little to
250 Of course, ACLU liberals might think such an ordinance violates the meaning of
America, but they would not engage in racist speech as a form of protest.
251
Neuborne, supra note 6, at 380; Strossen, supra note 22, at 559.
252 David 0. Sears, Symbolic Racism, in EUMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN CoNTRoVERS

(Phyliss A. Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988) [hereinafter Sears, Symbolic Racism]; Robert
M. Entman, Blacks in the News: Television, Modern Racism and CulturalChange, 69JouRNALiSM
Q. 341 (1992); Donald R. Kinder & David 0. Sears, Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism
Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life, 40J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHO- 414 (1981) [hereinafter Prdudiceand Politics];JohnB. McConahay &Joseph C. Hough, Jr., Symbolic Racism, 32
J. Soc. IssuEs 23 (1976); David 0. Sears et al., Whites' Opposition to "Busing: Self-Interest or
Symbolic Politics?, 73 AM. PoLt Sci. REV. 369 (1979); David 0. Sears & Donald R. Kinder,
Whites' Opposition to Busing. On Conceptualizing and OperationalizingGroup Conflict, 48J. PERsoNALI-ry & Soc. PSYCHOLt 1141 (1985). See also sources cited supra note 214.
253 Preudice and Politics, supra note 252, at 416.
254 Id. at 414.
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do with their own self-interest and much to do with symbolic
2 55
racism.
Other theorists place less emphasis on the role of prejudice and
more emphasis on the role of real group conflict over access to material or other goods, or status competition.2 56 From this perspective,
racism is a rational attempt to maintain an advantageous position even
if what is at stake is not a material good, but merely a racial status. In
their view, the symbolic race theorists define self-interest too narrowly.
Without resolving the debate, it seems clear that prejudice and
realistic group conflict are both important and, in many circumstances, dynamically interrelated.2 57 Moreover, there is considerable
overlap between the two theories. People who are relatively low in the
socio-economic hierarchy (and who consequently feel deprived) are
more likely to harbor resentment toward people of color than those
who are higher.2 58 Derrick Bell argues that it has been traditional for
American politicians (either explicitly or through code words) to rally
whites
on the basis of racial pride and patriotism to accept their often lowly
lot in life, and encourage[ ] [them] to vent their frustration by opposing any serious advancements by blacks. Crucial to this situation
is the unstated understanding by the mass of whites that they will
accept large disparities in economic opportunity in respect to other
whites as long as they have a priority over blacks and other people
259
of color for access to the few opportunities available.
Whether the racism of whites is fueled by prejudice, status competition, or both, whites in general do seem to resent special efforts to
help people of color. Indeed, attitude studies regularly show that
white Americans generally believe that government has done too
255

See supra sources cited note 252.

256 DERRicK BELL, FAcES AT THE BoTroM OF THE WELL (1992); ROBERT MILEs, RACISM
(1989); DAvm T. WEu.MAN, PORTRArrs OF WHrrE RAcISM (2d ed. 1993); Lawrence Bobo,

Group Conflict, PrJudice,and the Paradox of ContemporaryRacialAttitudes, in ELIMINATING RACISM PROFILES IN CoNTROVmsy 85 (Phyllis A. Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988) [hereinafter Bobo, Group Conflict]; Lawrence Bobo, Whites' Opposition to Busing Symbolic Racism or
Realistic Group Conflict?, 45J. PERsoNA=rY & Soc. PSYcHOL 1196 (1983); Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YAu L.J. 1, 91-103 (1992);Jim Sidanius et al., A Comparison of
Symbolic Racism Theory and Social Dominance Themy As Explanationsfor RacialPolicy Attitudes,
132J. Soc. PSYcHOL. 377 (1992).

257 Lawrence Bobo, for example, one of the most articulate critics of the theory of
symbolic racism, settles for the moderate conclusion that "alongsideour traditional concern
with individual prejudice, we should recognize the importance of group conflict." Bobo,
Group Conflict supra note 256, at 109 (emphasis added).
258 Scott Cummings, White Ethnics, Racial Prudice,and Labor Market Segmentation, 85
AM.J. Soc. 938 (1980); H. Edward Ransford, Blue CollarAnger Reactions to Student and Black
Protest, 37 AM. Sco. Rv. 333 (1972).
259 BELL, supra note 256, at 9.
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much for blacks.2 6 0 Of course, millions of people who do not claim
that people of color are inferior think that government has done too
much for people of color at the expense of the white middle class.
Although some would broadly label these millions "racists," in my view
it is better to think in this context of racism as occurring on a continuum, rather than deciding in a binary fashion whether particular people are or are not racists. Thus, in my view, one can wrongly believe
that government does too much for people of color without being a
racist. Nonetheless, if one holds that belief, it becomes natural (but
not inevitable) to resent not only the government which provides the
benefits, but also the "undeserving" beneficiaries. As I would characterize it, then, the more resentment, the more racism.
From the perspective of many millions of Americans, to enact racist speech regulations would be to pass yet another law exhibiting
special favoritism for people of color. What makes this kind of law so
potentially counterproductive is that its transformation of public racists into public martyrs would tap into widespread political traditions
and understandings in our culture.2 6 1 In short, the case of the martyr
2 62
would be appealingly wrapped in the banner of the American flag.

Millions of white Americans already resent people of color to some

260 Sears, Symbolic Racism, supra note 252, at 56-57.
261
Of course, penalties could be set at a very high level, and this might reduce the
number seeking to be martyrs, but it would also intensify the martyrdom and concomitantly fan the racism.
262
To reiterate, I am not claiming that nontargeted racist speech fails to cause injury.
But cf. Charles H. Jones, ProscribingHate: Distinctions Between Criminal Harm and Protected
Expression, 18 WM. MrrCHELL L. Ray. 935, 951 (1992) (arguing that presence or absence of
targeting determines whether offense or cognizable harm is present, by drawing on definition of harm from JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 33-36 (1984)). Much of the critical
race scholarship convincingly argues that even nontargeted racist speech harms many individuals and the community. See sources cited supra note 6. Moreover, sanctions would
offer some generalized relief. But, if imposing sanctions promotes fnore racism than exists
in the status quo (admittedly, a contestable claim), the case against sanctions is correspondingly strong.
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degree. To fuse that resentment 263 with Americans' love for the first
2 64
amendment is risky business.
I recognize that a substantial portion of this argument bears an
uncomfortable resemblance to an argument frequently made, by the
Court and some commentators, against affirmative action programs;
263 Richard Delgado has observed that British and Canadian laws against racist speech
met with initial resistance which has now largely subsided. Delgado, Campus Antiracism,
supra note 6, at 371. This observation might be used to support the notion that racial
polarization is not triggered by racist speech legislation (Professor Delgado uses it to argue
that fears of censorship proved to be misplaced. Id.). Whether or not racial polarization
was fostered in Britain and Canada, the prospects in the United States seem more bleak.
To be sure, racism exists in both Britain and Canada, but in the United States racism has
been central to election campaigns, and it seems to occupy a more central place in the
national consciousness.
Delgado argues that laws against racist speech could play a substantial role in controlling racism, suggesting such laws and rules would " ' create a public conscience and a standard for expected behavior that check overt signs of prejudice.' Nor is the change merely
cosmetic. In time, rules are internalized, and the impulse to engage in racist behavior
weakens." Id at 374 (quoting GORDON W. ALLPoRT, THE NATuRE OF PREJUDICE 470-71
(25th Anniversary ed. 1979)). This is sometimes true; the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides
a good example of the phenomenon of an anti-racism law eventually becoming internalized. On the other hand, anti-racist rules can create backlash. Many have argued that
busing and affirmative action programs have had such an effect. I do not contend, of
course, that backlash is the only factor to be used in making determinations about such
programs. See infra text accompanying notes 264-65. The issue I raise is whether racist
speech regulations are likely to produce such a backlash, and how much of a difference
that should make in assessing their desirability.
As I suggest later, see infra note 268, the rise of the anti-"political correctness" campaign exemplifies the resistance I believe more general racist speech regulation would
face. Finally, racist speech regulation in other countries has been accompanied by an increase in racial violence. Kevin Boyle, Overview of a Dilemma: Censorship versus Racism, in
STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRE sION AND NoN-DIscRIMINATION

1, 2

(Sandra Coliver ed., 1992); Paul Gordon, Racist Vwol:ence The Expression of Hate in Europe, in
id at 9, 9-17. I do not push this point because there might have been an even greater
increase of racial violence in the absence of such legislation. The same point applies to the
increase of racial violence on college campuses. And, as I also suggest later, see infra text
accompanying notes 276-78, the argument I make here is tentative and necessarily
speculative.
264 Proposed anti-pornography legislation seems to be quite different With exceptions, the commercial distributors of pornography are in the main less ideologically committed than members of the Klan or the neo-Nazis; thus, deterrence is likely to be more
effective. Similarly, the misogynist messages of pornography are less explicit than the racist
messages of the Klan or the neo-Nazis; thus, suppression of obscenity or pornography is
likely to be regarded as an unconstitutional suppression of a political ideology by many
fewer Americans. On the other hand, if society attempted generally to suppress
nontargeted hate speech against women, the general public would likely regard such an
attempt as unconstitutional.
I should be clear that the risk about which I am concerned is increased racism and its
consequences, not a risk to the first amendment. Some might argue that the creation of a
racist speech exception to the first amendment would lead the public to believe that in first
amendment jurisprudence all that matters is whose ox is being gored, and that any such
reaction would trigger public cynicism about the first amendment. With all the cynicism in
this country, however, the first amendment seems to have been untarnished. I am not
worried that public respect for the first amendment would be diminished in ways that
would be otherwise damaging.
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they "may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a
politics of racial hostility."2 65 The problem with these arguments is
not that they are false; affirmative action programs do create racial
hostility, 266 which is further fueled by the perception of many that
basic constitutional principles have been violated. Nonetheless, affirmative action programs provide benefits-such as access to jobs,
contracts, and places at educational institutions-which (at least in my
view and, more importantly, in the view of the recipientS)267 outweigh
the disadvantages. The difficulty with regulations against nontargeted
racist speech, I am suggesting, is that, unlike affirmative action programs, they are likely to promote racial hostility without sufficient compensatingadvantages.
Is this objection equally applicable to targeted racist speech? I do
not think so. Applying racist speech sanctions to targeted racist
speech does risk the same fanning of racial resentment, 26 8 but this

26 9
effect is somewhat mitigated by the presence of a specific victim.
When government protects a specific victim from a remark which is
270
personal, the public is much less likely to see the law as censorship.
Irrational as it may seem, a speaker who explicitly and obviously harms

265 City of Richmond v. J-. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
266 This is a common claim, and I believe it to be true, but it has yet to be "[ ]supported by any systematic evidence." Paul Burstein, Affirmative Action and the Rhetoric of Reaction, Am. PROSPECT, Summer 1993, at 138, 143.
267 This is true at least at the time of application (why else would they apply?), and I
am not aware of any study showing that beneficiaries generally are subsequently dissatisfied
with their decisions to apply and accept the benefits of such programs although, of course,
there are prominent examples of individuals who are now dissatisfied.
268 Indeed, the relentless right-wing media campaign against "political correctness"
underscores the capacity of hate speech regulations to foment racial hostility.
269 On the other hand, the aspect of my proposal that limits sanctions to speech attacking members of historically oppressed groups, borrowed from Matsuda, supra note 6, is
likely to be politically unpalatable in many contexts. To the extent that it is, it seems better
to drop that aspect than to drop prohibitions altogether. Apart from the politics of the
"second best" (an issue she has yet to address), I agree with Professor Matsuda.
270
One exception to my general view is speech in the workplace. Nontargeted speech
in that context can create a hostile environment. In that context, however, free speech
issues are taken far less seriously. MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 49-50. Some of the reasons
may be an intuition that the workplace is not a place for free speech (an intuition I do not
share, but which helps to explain why the issue has been regarded as more sensitive in
universities); the sense that racist workplace speech is actually discrimination; and perhaps
a general appreciation for the special difficulty of working under such conditions. One of
the general themes of MacKinnon's Only Words, supra note 6, is to ask whether it makes any
sense to recognize sexual and racial harassment by words in the workplace but not in other
contexts as discriminatory conduct.
Another exception to my general view occurs in the context of what the public would
regard as threats (regrettably, this class of speech is narrower than what victims would regard as threatening). Public sympathy for racist speakers who issue direct threats will be
low. At least, the question of whether to define speech as targeted or nontargeted should
be affected by the presence of threats. Certainly, if a small group is threatened by a
nontargeted racial epithet, worries that the imposition of sanctions would be counterproductive diminish substantially.
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a particular person through speech is often less sympathetic than one
whose speech hurts many more people. The harm is more concrete
and less diffuse.
More important, the principle that the legal system should avoid
the imposition of sanctions for particularized harm done to individual
victims, out of fear that the rendering of justice will fan racial resentment, is a principle to be avoided (save perhaps in the most extreme
of circumstances). The individual may wish to make that judgment
(by refusing to cooperate in a proceeding against the perpetrator),
but society should not. By contrast, when a group is generally victimized by racial slurs, the group should be fully entitled to decide that
legal remedies will make things worse for the group and decide that
legal remedies should not be made available despite the harm. Indeed, that is precisely what I argue people of color and the larger
society should conclude.
Many practitioners of outsider jurisprudence would resist that
conclusion. One reason for that resistance is the enormous symbolic
value of a broad prohibition on racist speech, which could be thought
to outweigh the harms associated with the increased racism that might
follow. For those of us who are not persons of color, the question
arises: who are we to weigh the symbolic value against the harm, if we
are neither the primary beneficiaries of the symbolic value nor the
potential victims of the discrimination and abuse? I have little difficulty in being predominantly guided on this issue by what the majority
of people of color think (recognizing, of course, that differences
among people of color may be substantial).
Nevertheless, there are considerations that ought to take some
steam out of the symbolic value argument. First, it should be recognized that political struggles are always fraught with symbolism. If a
general racist speech ban is passed, symbolic issues arise concerning
what kinds of racist remarks are properly prosecuted and which are
not. Any feelings of inclusiveness generated by the passage of hate
speech legislation might quickly dissipate. Moreover, even if the implementation of a racist speech ban would be effortless, other political
struggles of major symbolic importance would still recur, and for
many people, if not most, the joy of last year's symbolic victory will be
quickly eclipsed by the sadness of this year's defeat. Finally, there
ought to be some concern that what is of important positive symbolic
Finally, the likelihood of a counterproductive reaction is substantially reduced in some
"captive audience" situations. When, for example, nontargeted racist graffiti are placed in
dorms and other common living spaces in contexts where the manifest intent is to injure
or humiliate a captive audience, the perpetrator is far less likely to be regarded by the
public as engaging in protected dialogue. Here again, the line between targeted and
nontargeted speech tends to dissolve.
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value for people of color may have negative symbolic value for millions of others. When so many crucial issues of poverty, violence, and
other ills confront people of color,2 71 it may be prudent to have the
system give up chips in a different place.
There is another unhappy aspect to my overall conclusion: it suggests compromising with racist preferences in the case of nontargeted
racist speech. A practitioner of outsider jurisprudence might object
to the argument precisely on the ground that compromises with racism are abhorrent. 272 The alternative, however, as I have argued,
may only be to increase long-term racism by standing on principle.
Still, a practitioner of outsider jurisprudence might oppose compromising with racist preferences even if the alternative to compromise is
increased racism; she might argue that the psychic benefit (or Kantian
purity) of maintaining a simple political identity that never gives in to
racism is so attractive and powerful and has so much integrity that it
can ground counterproductive measures.
Ironically, ACLU liberalism takes similar pride in the uncompromising integrity with which it protects the first amendment. Both
ACLU liberalism and outsider jurisprudence of this stripe avoid compromise and adhere to a well defined, relatively uncomplicated political identity.
In a sense, this form of argument replays the 1960s rhetorical
conflict between some radicals and liberals. These radicals attacked
the liberals saying that they "sold out," that they lacked integrity, that
they accepted short term incremental gains at the expense of long
273
range radical change, and that they lacked "analysis" and vision.
The liberals, on the other hand, accused the radicals of being stubborn, unrealistic, utopian, and self-indulgent.
One of the interesting aspects of this dialogue, and of other arguments about political identity, is the extent to which political identity
can affect the estimate of the probable consequences of particular
political moves. Presumably, "hard line" ACLU liberals would have an
easy time concluding that racist speech regulation would increase racism. By contrast, "hard line" practitioners of outsider jurisprudence
have a stake in denying this. And the liberal, compromising
pragmatists-who seek not to be marginalized, who appreciate their
place in the dialectical dance, and who revel in the diversity and com271
272

See sources cited supra note 4.
Cf.WEsT, supra note 4, at 65 ("In American politics, progressives must not only

cling to redistributive ideals, but must also fight for those policies that-out of compromise and concession-imperfectly conform to those ideals. Liberals who give only lip service to these ideals, trash the policies in the name of realpolitik,or reject the policies as they

perceive a shift in the racial bellwether give up precious ground too easily.").
273 E.g., THE NEw STUDENT LEFr: AN ANTHOLOGY (Mitchell Cohen & Dennis Hale eds.,
1967).
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plications of political and social reality-may look for complexity and
find it (whether or not it is there). Hard proof about either the conclusions or the underlying psychology would be hard to come by.
In any event, my contention should be clear. I am not arguing
that racist speech should be protected to safeguard the liberty of the
speaker or because it is valuable. Nor do I think that counter speech
will cure the harm of public racist speech.2 74 I am not worried about a
chilling effect in the marketplace of ideas (though some marginally
valuable speech could be lost), nor am I worried about the vagueness
of working out standards case by case (though vagueness is of course
not a virtue).275
The argument I raise is quite different. It suggests that American
society may be so thoroughly racist that nontargeted racist speech regulations would be counterproductive. If I thought such regulating
would be effective on balance in combatting racism, I would presently
support punitive measures against public instances of racial vilification even when not targeted against individuals. 2 76 Further, I want to
make clear that I am doing no more than putting an argument on the
table. In a deep sense, the choice is not ultimately mine to make;
therefore, I do not seek to impose my predictions and weighing of the
potential effects of racist speech regulations on people of color. Were
I a member of a legislature who made this argument only to find it
rejected by people of color, I would vote, according to their preferences, for nontargeted racist speech regulation. It is their lives which
will predominately be affected by the legislation, and it is this effect
that is the crux of my argument. 277 Similarly, as a contributor to academic dialogue, I believe that an argument of this sort carries considerably less weight if the people purportedly advantaged by it end up
274 See generally Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 6 (arguing that free speech not
only fails to combat racism, but can exacerbate the problem). I do not mean to suggest
that more speech is never helpful. It cannot erase injury, however, and it will not eliminate
the racist character of society.
275 Too many people assume that vagueness is always fatal in first amendment analysis;
much vagueness is tolerated in first amendment doctrine, and it should be. Take defamation. Sorting out the differences between defamatory and nondefamatory statements is not
always easy, but that does not make the tort of defamation unconstitutional. The amount
of vagueness that is tolerable in first amendment contexts should depend on the importance of the governmental interest, the extent to which the regulation furthers the interest,
the possibility of less restrictive alternatives, and the impact of the vagueness on protected
speech.
276 My conclusion is, therefore, contingent on empirical conditions. In many other
societies, the case for broader racist speech regulations seems stronger, and the experience
with such regulations, albeit mixed, seems to have been positive in many jurisdictions.
STRIKING A BALANCE:

HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF ExPREssION AND NoN-DISCRIMINATION

(Sandra Coliver ed., 1992).
277 For the more sweeping contention that people of color (or other oppressed
groups) should control the resolution of all issues that affect them exclusively, see Ius M.
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE PoLnCs OF DIFFERENE

184 (1990).
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ultimately, after consideration, rejecting it.278 People of color might
think that the tangible benefits of deterrence and the symbolic importance of the legislation outweigh the speculative possibilities of
nondeterrence, evasion, and increased racial hostility-that, in short,
the advantages of taking a stand outweigh the costs.
They might. But they might not. Arguments never pressed are
never adopted. So I suggest that attention be focused more upon the
empirical costs and benefits of racist speech regulation and less upon
the all-too-frequently exaggerated first amendment values.
CONCLUSION

In the course of this discussion of R.A. V and racist speech, I have
discussed five major different perspectives on the issue of racist
speech. Justice Scalia seems moved by the image of a content-neutral
government, although that image is deeply compromised in practice.
Justice White appears to pursue the image of an impartial magistrate
bound by the rule of law, though his reading of the law is badly
skewed in the R.A.V case. St. Paul's ordinance, as construed by the
state supreme court, seems to reflect a conception that uninhibited
public debate deserves protection but private racial epithets do not.
St. Paul's ordinance is not ideal from the perspective of outsider jurisprudence because it punishes speech against historically advantaged
groups as well as historically disadvantaged groups, drawing no distinction between them. It thus fails to appreciate the amplified character of the injuries such remarks cause minorities, and leaves open
the prospect of selective prosecution of minority speakers.
The dissent perspective I endorse is not an instance of outsider
jurisprudence; for one thing, it is not built predominantly from the
experience of people of color. It protects both dissent by the powerful press 279 and dissent from the marginalized. It freely employs an
insider's perspective in defending dissent, contending that the system
benefits from continued critique. Nonetheless, the dissent perspective shares much with the outsider perspective, and the conclusion I
draw from the dissent perspective is one that I think outsider jurisprudence should also favor. Speech targeted at members of historically
278 In addition, victims of discrimination may be particularly acute in determining the
circumstances in which, and the extent to which, discrimination arises.

On the other hand, identifying what the "general will" of people of color is could be
quite tricky. People of color are divided on the issue of hate speech regulation. How
much of a majority does one need in order to defer? Does one need a sense of the amount
of information held by those who have opinions? I do not purport to resolve questions like
these. I only mean to observe that deference is appropriate, but that the determination to
defer could be undermined by diversity of opinions.
279 Practitioners of outsider jurisprudence would probably do so as well, but the emphasis of the perspectives is different.
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oppressed racial groups that insults on the basis of race ought to be
punished; 28 0 individuals deserve redress 28 1 for what is intended and
felt as particularized injury282 even if racist speech regulations are symbolically ineffective or even counterproductive. But government intervention against nontargeted racist speech depends on a judgment
that it will effectively promote-or even institute-an anti-racist public morality in our culture. Public morality may, perhaps, be furthered through other forms of socialization, 283 but the combination
of racism and of the purist stories we tell ourselves about the first
amendment (despite actual doctrine, which is far from absolutist)
makes it unlikely that racist speech regulation could ever serve as an
effective source of anti-racist public morality.
There are many stories we tell ourselves about the first amendment, however, and America would still have a FIRST AMENDMENT
and a strong first amendment tradition even if it enacted general racist speech regulations. The problem is not the first amendment; the
problem is that racism is now and always has been a central part of the
meaning of America.

280 People will not be converted merely because they are punished, Minow, supra note
6, at 1403, and "re-education" of the perpetrator is not a promising form of punishment.
Grey, supra note 6, at 88 n.19 (rejecting multicultural sensitivity training as punishment for
harassment).
281 This is not to assume that all individuals will move for redress; much of the writing
about the injuries caused by racist speech makes clear that flight may be a more frequent
reaction than confrontation. But the availability of the remedy is what justice seems to
require. Victims of physical assault might not pursue redress, but they deserve a potential
remedy.
282 The same statements are likely in most circumstances to cause broader injury to
individuals not explicitly targeted and may be intended to do so, but that harm would not
be the basis for regulation.
283 I do not see any particular grounds for optimism. See generallyBELL, supra note 256
(racism is probably a permanent feature of American society).

